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1. Introduction
Double auctions are among the most prevalent forms of economic transactions. They
also occupy a central place in economic theory, as the microfoundation of the idea of the
market in standard microeconomics.
Despite their importance, double auction markets are not easy to organize or analyze.
Most common mechanisms quote a price that equates supply and demand and let the
objects change hands at that price, but such mechanisms are not always incentive com-
patible. That is, participants sometimes have incentives to misreport their preferences.
The resulting misreporting can lead to inefficiency of equilibrium outcomes. The prob-
lem becomes even more difficult once we allow for traders with interdependent values or
multi-unit demand or supply, and yet these are common features for many double auction
environments.
The goal of our paper is to study whether desirable properties are mutually compatible
in double auction markets with interdependent values and multi-unit demand and supply.
To address this question, we construct a mechanism that, with an arbitrary number
of buyers and sellers, satisfies ex post incentive compatibility and ex post individual
rationality. These properties make truth-telling and voluntary participation an ex post
equilibrium under this mechanism. Moreover, we show that the mechanism never runs
deficit,1 and has the property that the number of objects sold by the sellers coincides with
the number of objects bought by the buyers.
As is the case for other mechanisms studied in the literature, our mechanisms are not
fully efficient. In fact, the celebrated impossibility result by Myerson and Satterthwaite
(1983) implies that it is impossible to achieve all those properties even under private
values and single-unit demand and supply. However, we establish asymptotic efficiency
of our mechanism. That is, our second main result shows that the trade outcome in the
mechanism converges to the efficient level as in a competitive equilibrium under certain
additional conditions, as the number of buyers and sellers go to infinity. This result
suggests that the outcome of our mechanism is close to a fully efficient, first-best outcome,
at least in large economies. In all, our analysis shows that incentive compatibility and
other desirable properties can be achieved while achieving asymptotic efficiency as well.
1While our mechanism can run surplus, it is easy to modify the mechanism to satisfy exact ex post
budget balance. See footnote 18 for detail.
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Our positive result is obtained by constructing a new class of double auction mecha-
nisms, which we call the groupwise-price double-auction mechanisms (or simply, groupwise-
price mechanisms). A groupwise-price mechanism divides the entire market into a num-
ber of submarkets. Each submarket is composed of a subset of buyers and sellers, and all
trades happen between buyers and sellers in the same submarket. For each submarket, we
set a reference price for that submarket which is independent of reported types of agents
in that submarket. Agents in the submarket trade based on the reference price, although
not necessarily at it.2 We show that these mechanisms satisfy all the aforementioned
desiderata such as ex post incentive compatibility and asymptotic efficiency.
Related Literature. Few existing studies have offered a double auction mechanism that
is ex post incentive compatible and asymptotically efficient. McAfee (1992) is an impor-
tant exception, who makes a seminal contribution to this problem. He considers buyers
and sellers with private values and single-unit supply and demand. In that setting, he
proposes a mechanism that is dominant-strategy incentive compatible (which is equiva-
lent to ex post incentive compatibility with private values) and asymptotically efficient.
Our marginal contribution over McAfee (1992) is that we allow for interdependent values
and multi-unit demand and supply. Both features are important for most double auction
markets in practice. McAfee’s mechanism handles neither of these features, and thus our
mechanism is based on a different idea. In fact, even in the case with private values and
single-unit demand and supply, our mechanism does not reduce to McAfee’s.
Independently from our study, an ongoing work by Loertscher and Mezzetti (2014)
considers an extension of McAfee (1992) to an environment with multi-unit demand and
supply. In a private-values environment, they present a dominant-strategy incentive com-
patible mechanism and its simple “clock” implementation. A main advantage of our paper
compared to theirs is that we allow for interdependent values. On the other hand, they
allow for multi-dimensional types while we only allow for one-dimensional types (see the
next paragraph for difficulties with multi-dimensional interdependent values known in the
literature).
Our paper is part of the literature of mechanism design with interdependent valuations,
where many existing studies have found impossibility results. For example, Jehiel and
Moldovanu (2001) and Jehiel et al. (2006) demonstrate the difficulties associated with
interdependent values and multidimensional signals under the transferable utility setup.
2The specific manner that the trading price is determined is important for incentive compatibility.
We will defer detail to the main body of the paper, because it is rather complicated and needs formal
definitions in order to describe it precisely.
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Che, Kim and Kojima (2015) show that, even with single-dimensional signals, similar
impossibility results are obtained in a non-transferable utility setup. In our paper, we
circumvent those impossibility results by considering an environment where each agent’s
signal is summarized by a one-dimensional statistic with the standard single-crossing
condition (Maskin, 1992; Dasgupta and Maskin, 2000), and the agents have quasi-linear
utilities.3
Our work was partly inspired by a recent work by Hashimoto (2013).4 In an object allo-
cation setting, he offers a general procedure to modify a given mechanism into an ex post
incentive compatible one, while approximating the original mechanism in large markets.
He applies his technique to construct a mechanism that is ex post incentive compatible
and asymptotically efficient. While inspired by his work, our result is independent of
his. The main difference is that his method presumes that no individual initially owns
an object, such as in (one-sided) auction environments. As such, his mechanism does
not necessarily guarantee individual rationality if applied to double auction, although
individual rationality is crucial in the double auction environment.5
Our groupwise-price mechanism defines prices for a subset of agents independently of
their own reports, thereby preventing some obvious price-manipulation incentives. Similar
ideas are used in several earlier contributions, such as Cordoba and Hammond (1998) and
Kovalenkov (2002) for exchange economies, Segal (2003) for optimal pricing, and Baliga
and Vohra (2003) for double auction markets.6 However, as opposed to their private-value
settings, with interdependent values, using groupwise prices does not immediately imply
that truth-telling is ex post incentive compatible. One issue is that, because an agent’s
signal can affect the other agents’ demands or supplies, even if she cannot affect her price
directly, she may have an incentive to manipulate her report to affect the quantities of
3Under these assumptions, Maskin (1992), Dasgupta and Maskin (2000), and Perry and Reny (2002)
show that exact efficiency can be achieved. However, note that they study one-sided auction, and the
results do not extend to our double auction setting. In fact, as mentioned below, exact efficiency is not
achievable.
4Azevedo and Budish (2012) provide mechanisms that are approximately, but not exactly, incentive
compatible. The main goal of the current study is different in that we obtain an exactly incentive
compatible mechanism, but the basic motivation is similar.
5Another paper related to ours is Matsushima (2008). Although he considers double auction with
interdependent values like us, his mechanism does not satisfy individual rationality because some agents
earn negative payoffs with a small, but positive, probability.
6The basic idea of defining personalized or groupwise prices appears to be well-known, and the authors
have been unable to locate the first to propose it. Jackson and Manelli (1997) call this type of mechanisms
“folk” mechanisms.
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trade.7 We overcome this issue by designing a mechanism such that an agent’s report
does not affect the demand or supply of the other agents in the same group. Because of
these features, our mechanism cannot use the agents’ information in a fully efficient way,
which necessitates extra care for showing asymptotic efficiency.
Our paper is part of the extensive literature on double auctions. Existing studies have
shown that behavior under Bayesian equilibria converges to truth-telling as the number
of traders increases (and the outcome achieves asymptotic, though not exact, efficiency)
in a broad class of double auction mechanisms. Important contributions in this tradition
include Gresik and Satterthwaite (1989), Rustichini, Satterthwaite and Williams (1994),
Fudenberg, Mobius and Szeidl (2007), and Cripps and Swinkels (2006) for the private
values case, and Reny and Perry (2006) for the interdependent values case.8 The main
difference between this line of research and ours is that these papers study Bayesian
equilibrium behavior of the participants in mechanisms that are not necessarily ex post
incentive compatible. Our motivation is to design a mechanism that is ex post incentive
compatible, which makes truthtelling a best response irrespective of the participants’
beliefs about others’ signals. As such, we believe that our paper complements the existing
studies of double auctions.
More broadly, our asymptotic analysis can be situated in a long tradition of economic
theory on large-market properties of mechanisms. In large exchange economies, Roberts
and Postlewaite (1976) demonstrate that the Walrasian mechanism is difficult to manipu-
late under some conditions. Jackson (1992), Jackson and Manelli (1997), and Andreyanov
and Sadzik (2016) investigate exchange economies from asymptotic perspectives as well.
More recently, Roth and Peranson (1999), Immorlica and Mahdian (2005), Kojima and
Pathak (2009), Lee (2011), and Ashlagi, Kanoria and Leshno (2013) show that the de-
ferred acceptance algorithm due to Gale and Shapley (1962) becomes increasingly hard
to manipulate in large markets. In the object allocation setting without transfers, as-
ymptotic incentive compatibility and asymptotic efficiency of various mechanisms have
been established by Kojima and Manea (2010), Che and Kojima (2010), Liu and Pycia
(2011), and Azevedo and Budish (2012). Our paper identifies another case in which both
incentive compatibility and efficiency become achievable in large economies, reinforcing
the insights from these existing studies.
7To satisfy the feasibility constraint, we use a rationing rule (through an auction mechanism of Ausubel
(1999)). Hence, manipulation of quantities by an agent (without affecting prices) is a relevant concern.
8See also Kazumori (2013) who shows that, under interdependent values, every trembling hand perfect
equilibrium asymptotically approximates ex post price taking behavior.
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2. Model
There are a set of buyers B and a set of sellers S. Let nB ∈ N be the number of buyers,
and nS ∈ N be the number of sellers. There is one type of indivisible object, as well as
divisible money.
Each agent can buy or sell at most m ∈ N units of the object. Each agent i ∈ B ∪ S
is endowed with a signal, which we refer to as her type, ti ∈ [0, 1]. Type ti is agent
i’s private information. Let t = (ti)i∈B∪S denote the profile of types. Given type profile
t, each agent i’s value profile is (vℓi (t))
m
ℓ=1. For each buyer b and index ℓ ∈ {1, . . . , m},
vℓb(t) ∈ [0, 1] is b’s valuation for the ℓ-th unit of the object. For each seller s and each
ℓ ∈ {1, . . . , m}, vℓs(t) ∈ [0, 1] is the cost of giving up the ℓ-th unit of the object for seller
s. We assume that each agent has a quasi-linear utility function. More precisely, for each
buyer b, her payoff from consuming ℓ ∈ {1, . . . , m} units of the object and paying money
τ ∈ R is given by
ℓ∑
ℓ′=1
vℓ
′
b (t)− τ.
For each seller s, her payoff from giving up ℓ ∈ {1, . . . , m} units of the object and receiving
money τ ∈ R is given by
τ −
ℓ∑
ℓ′=1
vℓ
′
s (t).
For each i and ℓ, we assume that vℓi (·) is continuous, non-decreasing in each argument,
and strictly increasing in ti. For each ℓ, we assume v
ℓ
b(t) > v
ℓ+1
b (t) for all b ∈ B and
vℓs(t) < v
ℓ+1
s (t) for all s ∈ S. That is, buyers have diminishing marginal utility and
sellers have increasing marginal cost. We also impose a single-crossing condition. More
specifically, for each i, j ∈ S ∪B, ℓ, ℓ′ ∈ {1, . . . , m}, and t = (ti, t−i), if v
ℓ
i (t) ≥ v
ℓ′
j (t), then
for any t′i > ti, v
ℓ
i (t
′
i, t−i) > v
ℓ′
j (t
′
i, t−i). For normalization, we assume that the highest
possible valuation is 1 and the lowest possible valuation is 0 (across buyers and sellers,
and across units of the object).
2.1. Mechanisms and Desirable Properties. A (double auction) mechanism is a
pair of functions ϕ = (ζ, τ) from the set of type profiles to the sets of object allocations
and transfers. More specifically, for each type profile t = (ti)i∈S∪B and agent i ∈ B ∪ S,
ζi(t) ∈ {1, . . . , m} is the number of objects that i trades (so, ζi(t) is the number of objects
received if i is a buyer and the number of objects sold if i is a seller), and τi(t) is the
transfer for i (so, τi(t) is the money that i pays if i is a buyer, and the payment that i
receives if i is a seller).
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In the remainder of this section, we introduce desirable properties of mechanisms. The
main goal of our study is to construct a mechanism that satisfies these properties, which
we will do in the rest of the paper.
First, we introduce our central incentive compatibility concept. A mechanism ϕ = (ζ, τ)
is ex post incentive compatible if, for each t, we have
ζb(t)∑
ℓ=1
vℓb(t)− τb(t) ≥
ζb(t˜b,t−b)∑
ℓ=1
vℓb(t)− τb(t˜b, t−b), for each b ∈ B and t˜b ∈ [0, 1], and
τs(t)−
ζs(t)∑
ℓ=1
vℓs(t) ≥ τs(t˜s, t−s)−
ζs(t˜s ,t−s)∑
ℓ=1
vℓs(t), for each s ∈ S and t˜s ∈ [0, 1].
This condition requires that, given that every other agent reports her true type, reporting
the true type is a best response even in the ex post sense, i.e., it is a best response
even after all true types are revealed to the agent. This property provides certain robust
incentives to report true types (see Bergemann and Morris (2005) for instance).9
A mechanism ϕ = (ζ, τ) is ex post individually rational (or individually rational
for short) if, for each t, we have
ζb(t)∑
ℓ=1
vℓb(t)− τb(t) ≥ 0 for each b ∈ B, and
τs(t)−
ζs(t)∑
ℓ=1
vℓs(t) ≥ 0 for each s ∈ S.
This is a standard condition in the literature and important for voluntary participation.
A mechanism ϕ = (ζ, τ) is feasible if, for each t, we have∑
b∈B
ζb(t) ≤
∑
s∈S
ζs(t).
This condition requires that the number of the objects that are sold is weakly larger than
the number of the objects that are bought. This ensures that the trade is feasible, as the
set of the objects sold by the sellers offers enough supply to satisfy the demand by the
buyers who are prescribed to buy the objects.
A mechanism ϕ = (ζ, τ) is non-wasteful if, for each t, we have∑
b∈B
ζb(t) ≥
∑
s∈S
ζs(t).
This condition requires that the mechanism never wastes an object by buying up objects
from sellers while not assigning all of these objects to buyers.
9See also Wilson (1987).
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A mechanism ϕ = (ζ, τ) runs no ex post budget deficit (or no budget deficit for
short) if, for each t, we have ∑
b∈B
τb(t) ≥
∑
s∈S
τs(t).
This condition ensures that the auction organizer never runs deficit. We regard this
condition as important for the sustainability of a mechanism.
A stronger condition than no budget deficit is of some interest. A mechanism ϕ = (ζ, τ)
is ex post budget-balanced (or budget-balanced for short) if, for each t, we have∑
b∈B
τb(t) =
∑
s∈S
τs(t).
While sometimes assumed in the literature, we do not regard budget balance to be indis-
pensable as far as the mechanism runs no budget deficit. For that reason, our group-wise
price mechanism never runs a budget deficit, but can run budget surplus, violating the
exact budget balance. However, we will later show that it is straightforward to modify
our groupwise-price mechanism into a mechanism that satisfies the exact budget balance.
See Section 4.1 for detail.
As the first-best benchmark, we consider a (complete information) competitive equilib-
rium. Formally, a mechanism ϕ = (ζ, τ) is said to be a competitive mechanism if it
satisfies the following condition: For any type profile t,∑
b∈B
ζb(t) =
∑
s∈S
ζs(t),
and there exists p(t) such that
(1) For each buyer b ∈ B,
ζb(t) ∈ arg max
ℓ∈{0,...,m}
ℓ∑
ℓ′=1
vℓ
′
b (t)− p(t)ℓ,
(2) For each seller s ∈ S,
ζs(t) ∈ arg max
ℓ∈{0,...,m}
p(t)ℓ−
ℓ∑
ℓ′=1
vℓ
′
s (t),
(3) τi(t) = p(t)ζi(t) for every agent i ∈ B ∪ S.
In other words, a competitive mechanism lets each agent buy or sell optimally given
price p(t) where the price p(t) balances demand and supply.10 From the definition it is
10It is straightforward to see that there exists a competitive mechanism.
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obvious that any competitive mechanism satisfies individual rationality, feasibility, non-
wastefulness, budget balance and, perhaps most importantly, efficiency. The main draw-
back of a competitive mechanism is that it does not satisfy ex post incentive compatibility
(it fails even weaker conditions such as Bayesian incentive compatibility). In fact, there
exists no mechanism that satisfies all of these desirable properties including efficiency
in the exact sense (Myerson and Satterthwaite, 1983).11 The main goal of this paper
is to offer a mechanism that achieves an efficiency level arbitrarily close to a competi-
tive mechanism, while satisfying ex post incentive compatibility and the other desirable
properties.
2.2. The Groupwise-Price Double Auction Mechanism. The class of double auc-
tion mechanisms we examine is called the groupwise-price double auction mecha-
nisms, or the groupwise-price mechanisms for short. A groupwise-price mechanism
is defined as follows (because its formal definition is somewhat complicated, we provide
an informal description following the formal definition).
(1) Let B be (possibly randomly) partitioned into K sets B1, . . . , BK of equal size.
Let S be (possibly randomly) partitioned into K sets S1, . . . , SK of equal size.
12
(2) Each agent i simultaneously reports type ti (not necessarily truthfully).
Now, for each k ∈ {1, . . . , K}, the submarket k is composed of the set of agents
Bk ∪ Sk. The trading procedure in this submarket is described as follows.
(1) Let pk = pk((ti)i/∈(Bk∪Sk)) be a real number that depends on (ti)i/∈(Bk∪Sk) while not
on (ti)i∈(Bk∪Sk). We call it the reference price for the submarket k in the sense
explained below.13
(2) Let t = ((ti)i/∈Sk , (0)i∈Sk) and t = ((ti)i/∈Bk , (1)i∈Bk).
(3) Define
B∗k(t) = {(b, ℓ) ∈ Bk × {1, . . . , m}|v
ℓ
b(t) ≥ pk},
S∗k(t) = {(s, ℓ) ∈ Sk × {1, . . . , m}|v
ℓ
s(t) < pk}.
11In the setting with multiple buyers and sellers, Williams (1999) finds conditions for the existence of
a mechanism that satisfies these desirable properties. His conditions are in general not satisfied in out
setting.
12If |B| is not a multiple of K, then find a largest integer z such that |B| ≥ zK, exclude |B| − zK
buyers, and redefine B in the description of the mechanism as the set of the remaining buyers (and apply
a similar redefinition to S as well). By modifying the mechanism in this way, all the results in the paper
hold. In the rest of the paper, we assume |B| and |S| are multiples of K without loss.
13The choice of the reference prices are crucial for asymptotic efficiency, as we will show in a subsequent
section, while all other results hold for an arbitrary choice of the reference prices.
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(4) Order the elements in B∗k(t) in a decreasing manner in terms of the associated
valuations vℓb(t), and the elements in S
∗
k(t) in an increasing manner in terms of the
associated valuations vℓs(t).
14 Let x = min{|B∗k(t)|, |S
∗
k(t)|}, and let B
∗∗
k (t) be the
set of the first x elements of B∗k(t), and S
∗∗
k (t) be the set of first x elements of S
∗
k(t)
(so B∗∗k (t) = B
∗
k(t) if |B
∗
k(t)| ≤ |S
∗
k(t)|, and similarly, S
∗∗
k (t) = S
∗
k(t) otherwise).
(5) For each b ∈ Bk and ℓ, define
t˜ℓb(t−b) = inf{t˜b|(b, ℓ) ∈ B
∗∗
k (t˜b, t−b)},
if the set in the right hand side of this equation is nonempty, and let t˜ℓb(t−b) = 1
otherwise. Similarly, for each s ∈ Sk and ℓ, define
t˜ℓs(t−s) = sup{t˜s|(s, ℓ) ∈ S
∗∗
k (t˜s, t−s)},
if the set in the right hand side of this equation is nonempty, and let t˜ℓs(t−s) = 0
otherwise.
Note that, by the single-crossing condition, once (b, ℓ) ∈ B∗∗k (t
′
b, t−b) for some t
′
b,
then for any t′′b > t
′
b, (b, ℓ) ∈ B
∗∗
k (t
′′
b , t−b). Also, note that t˜
ℓ
b(t−b) is non-decreasing
in ℓ. Similar properties hold for the sellers.
(6) Buyer b receives the ℓ-th unit of the object if and only if (b, ℓ) ∈ B∗∗k (t), and pays
the price vℓb(t˜
ℓ
b(t−b), t−b) for that unit.
15 Seller s sells the ℓ-th unit of the object if
and only if (s, ℓ) ∈ S∗∗k (t), and receives the price v
ℓ
s(t˜
ℓ
s(t−s), t−s) for that unit.
As is clear in the description, the key parameters of each groupwise-price mechanism
comprise the number of submarkets (groups), K, and the reference price for each sub-
market k, pk((ti)i/∈(Bk∪Sk)). In Section 3 we show that all the desirable properties except
for asymptotic efficiency hold true for any choice of K and {pk(·)}
K
k=1. In Section 4, we
show asymptotic efficiency for a specific choice of them.
While the formal definition of this mechanism is somewhat involved, the basic idea is
simple: divide the market into a number of submarkets (groups), and use group-specific
prices (hence the name “groupwise-price mechanism”). Each submarket is composed of
a subset of buyers and sellers, and all trades happen only between buyers and sellers in
the same submarket. For each submarket, we set a reference price for that submarket
14When the valuations of multiple agents are identical, we order them in some fixed order (where that
order is independent of reported types).
15Note that, if b trades the ℓ-th unit, then she necessarily trades the ℓ′-th unit for every ℓ′ < ℓ as well.
If b receives ℓ units of the object in total, then her payment is
∑ℓ
ℓ′=1 v
ℓ′
b (t˜
ℓ′
b (t−b), t−b). A similar comment
applies to sellers.
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independently of reported types of agents in that submarket. In this way, we can prevent
some obvious price-manipulation incentives.
However, because the reference price in submarket k does not use any information
about the agents’ types in that submarket, it is possible that the reference price does
not “clear” the demand and supply of that submarket. For example, the reference price
may be so high that the number of units the sellers in Sk want to sell is greater than the
number of units the buyers in Bk want to buy. Then, the mechanism runs a generalized
VCG auction (Ausubel, 1999) separately for each side of the market to satisfy feasibility
and non-wastefulness.16
Another incentive issue we need to overcome is specific to interdependent-value double
auction environments. Because a seller’s type report can affect buyers’ willingness to pay,
the seller may have an incentive to overreport her type so that the buyers in the same
submarket would buy more. Similarly, a buyer may have an incentive to underreport her
type. Our mechanism eliminates such an incentive by defining B∗k independent of any
report by the sellers in submarket k, and similarly, defining S∗k independent of any report
by the buyers in submarket k.
By tailoring the detail in this manner, the mechanism satisfies a number of desirable
properties (namely, ex post incentive compatibility, individual rationality, feasibility, non-
wastefulness, and no budget deficit), but at a cost of efficiency through the following two
channels. First, because the reference price in submarket k does not use any informa-
tion about the agents’ types in that submarket, some efficiency-enhancing trades within
the submarket may be prevented. In Section 4, we will address this problem by increas-
ing the number of submarkets and thus diminishing the effect of lost information for
16To run a generalized VCG auction as in Ausubel (1999), the designer must know the valuation
function of each agent i, vℓi (·), for each ℓ. This may be considered to be too demanding as the designer’s
prior knowledge. Dasgupta and Maskin (2000) and Perry and Reny (2002) study implementation of
efficient allocations in auction environments as an equilibrium of a game whose form does not depend on
the functional forms of the agents’ valuation functions (“detail-free” mechanisms, in the spirit of Wilson
(1987)). For example, Dasgupta and Maskin (2000) consider an auction mechanism where each bidder
names not only a single bid but the entire valuation functions given his signal. Perry and Reny (2002)
consider an auction mechanism where (at most two rounds of) a second-price auction is run for each pair
of bidders. These mechanisms are detail-free in the sense that their auction mechanisms do not require
the designer’s knowledge about the bidders’ valuation functions. We use a generalized VCG auction
as in Ausubel (1999) for its simple description, even though it is not detail-free. However, given that
our model satisfies both single-crossing preferences as in Dasgupta and Maskin (2000) and decreasing-
marginal-values as in Perry and Reny (2002), we conjecture that similar detail-free mechanisms may work
too. We leave this question for future research.
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each submarket. Second, because we divide the market into (many) submarkets, some
efficiency-enhancing trades across different submarkets may be prevented. Our technical
contribution for analyzing efficiency is to find that there is an appropriate growth rate of
the number of submarkets that balances out this tradeoff.
To illustrate how the mechanism works, we consider the following example.
Example 1. Letm = 2. In a submarket k, there are one seller s and two buyers b = b1, b2,
each with two units of supply and demand. The type of seller s is ts = 0.2, buyer b2’s
type is tb2 = 0.3, and ti = 0 for any i /∈ Bk, Sk. The values of seller s are v
ℓ
s(t) = 5ts = 1
for ℓ = 1, 2.17 For each buyer b = b1, b2 and each ℓ = 1, 2, we have v
ℓ
b(t) =
4
ℓ
tb +
∑
i 6=b ti.
Assume pk = 1.9. For the seller’s side, we have |S
∗
k(t)| = 2. We study how the trades
and prices change as tb1 ∈ [0, 1] varies. Given tb1 ,
vℓb1(t) =
4
ℓ
tb1 + 0.3,
vℓb1(t) =
4
ℓ
tb1 + 0.5,
vℓb2(t) =
1.2
ℓ
+ tb1 ,
vℓb2(t) =
1.2
ℓ
+ tb1 + 0.2.
If we gradually increase tb1 from 0, then at tb1 = 0.4, we have v
1
b1
(t) = 1.9. Because
vℓb2(t) < 1.9 for ℓ = 1, 2, we have t˜
1
b1
(t−b1) = 0.4. If we increase tb1 further, at tb1 = 0.7,
we have v1b2(t) = 1.9. Thus, for buyer b1 to buy the second unit, tb1 needs to be so high
that v2b1(t) ≥ v
1
b2
(t), or equivalently, tb1 ≥ 0.9. Because v
2
b2
(t) < 1.9 at tb1 = 0.9, we have
t˜2b1(t−b1) = 0.9.
Therefore, the price of each unit for buyer b1 is the following: v
1
b1
(0.4, t−b1) = 2.1 for the
first unit, and v2b1(0.9, t−b1) = 2.3 for the second unit. In this example, one can verify that
this mechanism satisfies ex post incentive compatibility, individual rationality, feasibility,
non-wastefulness, and no budget deficit. In the next section, we show that these desirable
properties hold generally under groupwise-price mechanisms. 
3. Results with arbitrary number of buyers and sellers
In this section, we show that our groupwise-price mechanism has desirable properties
introduced in Section 2.1. In particular, this mechanism is ex post incentive compatible.
17Although this example violates our assumptions that all valuations must lie in the unit interval and
that vℓi 6= v
ℓ′
i for each i and ℓ 6= ℓ
′, this is just for notational simplicity. We can modify the example to
satisfy these assumptions without changing the conclusion.
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Theorem 1. The groupwise-price mechanism satisfies
(1) ex post incentive compatibility,
(2) individual rationality,
(3) feasibility,
(4) non-wastefulness, and
(5) no budget deficit.18
Recall that all of the above properties are satisfied in Example 1. Theorem 1 shows
that these properties hold generally under groupwise-price mechanisms.
Proof. Ex post incentive compatibility and individual rationality. We consider
only the case of buyers, but a similar argument applies to the case of sellers as well.
Suppose that tb ∈ [t˜
ℓ
b(t−b), t˜
ℓ+1
b (t−b)], with the convention that t˜
0
b(t−b) = 0 and t˜
m+1
b (t−b) =
1.
Then, for each ℓ′ ≤ ℓ,
vℓ
′
b (tb, t−b)− v
ℓ′
b (t˜
ℓ′
b (t−b), t−b) ≥ 0,
and for each ℓ′ > ℓ,
vℓ
′
b (tb, t−b)− v
ℓ′
b (t˜
ℓ′
b (t−b), t−b) ≤ 0.
If the buyer b reports truthfully, then her utility is
ℓ∑
ℓ′=1
(
vℓ
′
b (tb, t−b)− v
ℓ′
b (t˜
ℓ′
b (t−b), t−b)
)
,
which is nonnegative, showing individual rationality. Moreover, the inequalities above
imply that misreporting b’s type does not increase her utility, demonstrating ex post in-
centive compatibility.
Feasibility and Non-wastefulness. Suppose that |B∗k(t)| ≥ |S
∗
k(t)|. In this case, the
number of units sold is |S∗∗k (t)| = |S
∗
k(t)|, and the number of units bought is |B
∗∗
k (t)| =
|S∗k(t)|. Similarly, if |B
∗
k(t)| ≤ |S
∗
k(t)|, then the number of units sold is |S
∗∗
k (t)| = |B
∗
k(t)|,
while the number of units bought is |B∗∗k (t)| = |B
∗
k(t)|. Thus, we have shown both feasi-
bility and non-wastefulness.
18The mechanism can be easily modified to satisfy budget balance as well if we specify any agent
(possibly randomly) as a residual claimant of the budget surplus at the beginning of the mechanism. See
Section 4.1 for detail.
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No budget deficit. By construction, for any b, ℓ, t, if (b, ℓ) ∈ B∗∗k (t) so that b trades her
ℓ-th unit, then the price she pays for that unit is
vℓb(t˜
ℓ
b(t−b), t−b) ≥ v
ℓ
b(t˜
ℓ
b(t−b), t−b) ≥ pk.
Similarly, for any s, ℓ, t, if (s, ℓ) ∈ S∗∗k (t) so that s trades ℓ-th unit, then the price she
receives for that unit is
vℓs(t˜
ℓ
s(t−s), t−s) ≤ v
ℓ
s(t˜
ℓ
s(t−s), t−s) ≤ pk.
Therefore, given the feasibility and non-wastefulness established above, the total mone-
tary transfer from the buyers is no smaller than the total monetary transfer to the sellers,
implying that the groupwise-price mechanism runs no budget deficit. This completes the
proof. 
4. Approximate efficiency
Next, we show that the double-auction mechanism constructed in the previous section
approximates an efficient allocation as the number of market participants goes to infinity.
In this section we consider a sequence of markets, where each market is indexed by
a positive integer N which we refer to as the market size. The number of sellers nS
and the number of buyers nB depend (deterministically) on N and grow at the same
asymptotic speed as N : Formally, there exist constants γ, γ ∈ (0,∞) such that for each
N , γN < nS, nB < γN (here we are suppressing dependence of nS and nB on N for
notational simplicity only). The case in which nS = nB = N is a special case, but note
that the condition is more general and allows for the number of sellers and buyers to be
different from each other even asymptotically.
Buyers have the same valuation function to one another and similarly for sellers. For
each i ∈ B, vℓi (ti, (tj)j∈B\{i}, (tj)j∈S) = v
ℓ
i (ti, (t
′
j)j∈B\{i}, (t
′
j)j∈S) if (t
′
j)j∈B\{i} is a permu-
tation of (tj)j∈B\{i} and (tj)j∈S is a permutation of (t
′
j)j∈S. Thus, we are assuming that
buyers are ex ante homogeneous, although their valuations can be distinct to one another
ex post because of different type realizations. We impose a similar symmetry condition
for each seller as well.
Next, we introduce two assumptions that regulate how agent valuations are affected by
type profiles in large markets.
Assumption 1. There exists a constant α ≥ 0 such that, for every sufficiently large
market size N , any pair of agents i and j 6= i, any index ℓ ∈ {1, . . . , m}, and any
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tj , t
′
j, t−j, we have
|vℓi (t−j, tj)− v
ℓ
i (t−j , t
′
j)| ≤
α
nB
, if j ∈ B,(4.1)
|vℓi (t−j, tj)− v
ℓ
i (t−j , t
′
j)| ≤
α
nS
, if j ∈ S.
This assumption implies that the influence of any one agent’s type on another agent’s
utility becomes small in large markets.19
Assumption 2. There exist β and β ′ with β ′ ≥ β > 0 such that, for every sufficiently
large market size N , any pair of agents i and j 6= i on the same side of the market (i.e.,
both i and j are buyers, or both are sellers), any index ℓ ∈ {1, . . . , m}, and any t,
β|ti − tj | ≤ |v
ℓ
i (t)− v
ℓ
j(t)| ≤ β
′|ti − tj|.(4.2)
The part β|ti − tj | ≤ |v
ℓ
i (t) − v
ℓ
j(t)| in (4.2) requires that a difference in types has a
first-order effect on the values. The part |vℓi (t)− v
ℓ
j(t)| ≤ β
′|ti − tj | in (4.2) requires that
two persons with similar types have similar values. Throughout this section, we maintain
Assumptions 1 and 2.
Remark 1. If the valuation functions are differentiable, the following conditions (i) and
(ii) together imply (4.1) and (4.2): (i) for any N , and for any pair of agents i and j 6= i,
any index ℓ ∈ {1, . . . , m}, and all t,
∂vℓi (t)
∂tj
≤
α
nS
, if j ∈ S,(4.3)
∂vℓi (t)
∂tj
≤
α
nB
, if j ∈ B,
and (ii) there exist δ and δ′ with δ′ ≥ δ > 0 such that, for any N , any agent i, any index
ℓ ∈ {1, . . . , m}, and all t,
δ ≤
∂vℓi (t)
∂ti
≤ δ′.(4.4)
In this differentiable case, the part δ ≤
∂vℓi (t)
∂ti
in (4.4) can be interpreted as requiring that
an agent’s own type influences her own value in a non-negligible manner everywhere, and
the part
∂vℓi (t)
∂ti
≤ δ′ can be interpreted as excluding some pathological cases by assuming
19Of course, it does not mean that the interdependence vanishes away in large markets. Agent i’s
value can vary with t−i in a non-negligible manner even in a large market, even though the effect of each
single tj , j 6= i, is vanishing.
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that there is a bound on the change in an agent’s utility for a small change in her own
type.20 
Remark 2. While excluding some cases, conditions (4.1) and (4.2) are satisfied by most
models in the literature. For example, let nB = nS = N ≥ 2, and for each buyer’s utility
function (and similarly for each seller’s), we may assume that there is a differentiable
function uℓ : [0, 1]→ R for each ℓ = 1, . . . , m such that vℓb(t) = u
ℓ(tb+ γ
∑
b′ 6=b tb′
N−1
) for some
constant γ ∈ (0, 1), and that, for some δ′ ≥ δ > 0, du
ℓ(x)
dx
∈ (δ, δ′) for all x. Then, (4.4) is
satisfied. Moreover, for any b′ 6= b,
∂vℓb(t)
∂tb′
=
duℓ(tb + γ
∑
b′′ 6=b tb′′
N−1
)
dx
×
γ
N − 1
≤
δ′γ
N − 1
=
δ′γ
N
×
N
N − 1
≤
2δ′γ
N
,
thus condition (4.3) is satisfied with respect to α = 2δ′γ. Recall, then, that (4.3) and
(4.4) imply (4.1) and (4.2).
Another example is an environment with “unobservable fundamentals”. Let nB = nS =
N , and let θ ∈ Θ be an unobservable variable that affects every agent’s valuation, and
assume that each agent i’s value for the ℓ-th unit of the trade is a function of only ti
and θ, which we denote by wℓi(ti, θ). We also assume that each type ti is identically and
independently distributed conditional on θ, where the conditional distribution of ti given
θ is assumed to be common knowledge. Then, vℓi (t) can be defined as the conditional
expectation of wℓi (ti, θ) given t, i.e., v
ℓ
i (t) = E(w
ℓ
i(ti, θ)|t). To be specific, let Θ = [0, 1],
assume that θ is distributed uniformly over [0, 1], and wℓi(ti, θ) =
1
ℓ
(ti + θ). Given θ, ti is
independently distributed with a density g(ti|θ) such that g(ti|θ) = 2 − 2θ for ti ∈ [0,
1
2
],
20It is straightforward that (4.3) implies (4.1). For (4.2), observe that
vℓi (t)− v
ℓ
j(t) = v
ℓ
i (t1, . . . , ti, . . . , tj , . . . , tnB+nS )− v
ℓ
j(t1, . . . , ti, . . . , tj , . . . , tnB+nS )
= vℓi (t1, . . . , ti, . . . , tj , . . . , tnB+nS )− v
ℓ
i (t1, . . . , tj , . . . , tj , . . . , tnB+nS )
+vℓi (t1, . . . , tj , . . . , tj , . . . , tnB+nS )− v
ℓ
i (t1, . . . , tj , . . . , ti, . . . , tnB+nS ),
so vℓi (t) − v
ℓ
j(t) ∈
[
δ(ti − tj)−
α
nB
(ti − tj), δ
′(ti − tj)
]
for ti ≥ tj and v
ℓ
i (t) − v
ℓ
j(t) ∈[
δ′(ti − tj), δ(ti − tj)−
α
nB
(ti − tj)
]
for ti < tj if i, j ∈ B (if i, j ∈ S, then analogous bounds replac-
ing nB with nS hold). Thus, (4.2) is satisfied for any sufficiently large N by taking β =
δ
2 and β
′ = δ′.
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and g(ti|θ) = 2θ for ti ∈ (
1
2
, 1]. Then, letting N1 = |{j|tj >
1
2
}|, we have21
vℓi (t) =
1
ℓ
(ti + E(θ|t))
=
1
ℓ
(
ti +
N1 + 1
N + 2
)
.
Therefore, for each j 6= i, any t, and any ℓ = 1, . . . , m, we have |vℓi (t−j, tj)−v
ℓ
i (t−j , t
′
j)| ≤
1
N
, and vℓi (t)− v
ℓ
j(t) =
ti−tj
ℓ
, and thus, both of the conditions (4.1) and (4.2) are satisfied.

We assume that agent types are conditionally independent given a state variable. More
formally, there is a state variable σ that is drawn randomly from a finite distribution.
For each realization of σ, there is a pair of type distributions with cdfs Fσ and Gσ with
everywhere positive and continuous pdf’s, and buyer and seller types are independently
distributed from Fσ and Gσ, respectively, conditional on σ. Note that the case with i.i.d.
type distributions is a special case of this model in which the distribution of the state
variable is degenerate.
In this setting, we specialize our groupwise-price mechanism by providing a partic-
ular procedure to set the parameters, namely, the number of submarkets K and the
reference prices (p1, . . . , pK), as follows. We call the resulting mechanism the canonical
groupwise-price mechanism.
• Set K to be an integer depending on N such that K →∞ and K
5
N
→ 0 as N →∞
and, for notational simplicity, such that nB and nS are multiples of K.
22 The
agents are divided into K submarkets, each with aB =
nB
K
buyers and aS =
nS
K
sellers.
• Given reported t, let tˆk = ((ti)i/∈(Sk∪Bk), (1)i∈(Sk∪Bk)), and let vˆ
(q)
B be the q-th highest
value among {vℓb(tˆk)}b∈B,ℓ, and vˆ
(q)
S be the q-th lowest value among {v
ℓ
s(tˆk)}s∈S,ℓ.
21Note that
E(θ|t) =
∫ 1
0 θ
(∏
j|tj≤
1
2
(1− θ)
)(∏
j|tj>
1
2
θ
)
dθ∫ 1
0
(∏
j|tj≤
1
2
(1 − θ)
)(∏
j|tj>
1
2
θ
)
dθ
=
∫ 1
0
(1 − θ)N−N1θN1+1dθ∫ 1
0 (1 − θ)
N−N1θN1dθ
,
where, for the denominator,∫ 1
0
(1− θ)N−N1θN1dθ =
1
N1 + 1
(1− θ)N−N1θN1+1
∣∣∣1
0
+
∫ 1
0
N −N1
N1 + 1
(1− θ)N−N1−1θN1+1
= ... =
(N −N1)!(N1)!
(N + 1)!
,
and similarly, for the numerator,
∫ 1
0
(1− θ)N−N1θN1+1dθ = (N−N1)!(N1+1)!(N+2)! . Therefore, E(θ|t) =
N1+1
N+2 .
22For example, K may be an integer of the order N c with c ∈ (0, 15 ) or of the order log(N).
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The reference price in submarket k, pk, is given by
pk = min
{
vˆ
(q)
B , vˆ
(q+1)
S
}
,
where q is an integer such that vˆ
(q)
S ≤ vˆ
(q)
B and vˆ
(q+1)
S > vˆ
(q+1)
B .
23 Note that we
include all buyers and sellers in computing pk.
We define asymptotic efficiency in terms of trade outcomes. We say that a mechanism
is asymptotically efficient if the ex ante non-monetary payoff of each agent in that
mechanism approaches that in a competitive mechanism, i.e., as N goes to infinity, for
any agent i, E[|
∑ζi(t)
ℓ=1 v
ℓ
i (t) −
∑ζ∗i (t)
ℓ=1 v
ℓ
i (t)|] → 0, where ζ denotes the object allocation
rule of our mechanism, and ζ∗ denotes that of a competitive mechanism. In this sense,
the trade outcome in the mechanism becomes “arbitrarily close” to the first-best level in
large economies.24
Theorem 2. The canonical groupwise-price mechanism is asymptotically efficient.
Proof. See Appendix A. 
The formal proof of this result is involved, so we offer some intuition here while deferring
the proof to the Appendix. To get the first intuition, recall that our groupwise-price
mechanism sets a reference price pk for each submarket k. This suggests that most
mutually beneficial trades can be realized if the reference prices approximate the market
clearing price in large economies.
However, whether this intuition goes through is far from obvious. More specifically,
there are at least two challenges. First, the reference price for a submarket must be
independent of reported types of agents in that submarket in order to keep ex post incentive
compatibility of the mechanism. This implies that the relevant information from agents in
a submarket should be ignored when setting that submarket’s reference price. This poses
a problem, because the reference price does not converge to the market-clearing price
even in a large market if private information from too many agents is ignored. Second,
even if the reference prices are close to the market-clearing prices, additional efficiency
loss can occur because agents in a submarket can trade only with those in the same
submarket. This can prevent some beneficial trades from happening between agents in
different submarkets.
23If vˆ
(q)
S ≤ vˆ
(q)
B for all q, then we set pk = vˆ
(mnS)
B . If vˆ
(q)
S > vˆ
(q)
B for all q, then we set pk = vˆ
(1)
S .
24Recall that our mechanism may generate budget surplus while a competitive mechanism balances
the budget. Hence the difference in the ex ante “total” (i.e., the sum of monetary and non-monetary)
payoffs may not vanish. Section 4.1 studies this issue and offers possible solutions to obtain stronger
convergence results.
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Our proof shows that inefficiencies from both of these sources can be appropriately
bounded. Regarding the first challenge, our approach is to divide the market into a
sufficiently large number of submarkets (i.e., K → ∞ as N → ∞). Doing so makes the
effect of ignoring types of one submarket for calculating reference prices negligible in large
markets, by which we show that the reference prices approximate a market-clearing price
in large economies (with high probability). Regarding the second challenge, our approach
is to keep the number of submarkets sufficiently small relative to N (i.e., K
N
→ 0 or
equivalently aB =
nB
K
, aS =
nS
K
→∞ as N →∞), so that the number of beneficial trades
prevented from happening across different submarkets is sufficiently small. Clearly, there
is a potential conflict between these two approaches. Our formal proof shows that there is
an appropriate growth rate of the number of submarkets such that these conflicting forces
can be balanced in such a way that both challenges are addressed. Furthermore, given
such an appropriate choice of the growth rate, a lower bound of the convergence rate is
obtained as a polynomial function of the size of the economy, N (see Remark 3 in the
Appendix). The existence of such a growth rate is not obvious, and we refer interested
readers to the proof in Appendix A.
4.1. Asymptotic Budget Balance. In the preceding section, we have established that
the trading pattern of the objects converges to an efficient one under the canonical
groupwise-price mechanism. However, this does not imply that the expected payoff of each
agent converges to the efficient level in the competitive mechanism, because a groupwise-
price mechanism can run budget surplus. Unless the budget surplus is included in the
welfare, this implies that the welfare level including transfer in groupwise-price mecha-
nisms can be lower than that in a competitive equilibrium.
To present a formal analysis on this issue, we begin by defining asymptotic budget
balance. A mechanism ϕ = (ζ, τ) is asymptotically budget-balanced if
lim
N→∞
E
[∑
b∈B τb(t)−
∑
s∈S τs(t)
nB + nS
]
= 0.
Note that nB and nS depend on N and γN < nB, nS < γN for some constants γ, γ ∈
(0,∞), so asymptotic budget balance is equivalent to
lim
N→∞
E
[∑
b∈B τb(t)−
∑
s∈S τs(t)
N
]
= 0.
This condition ensures that the per-capita budget imbalance converges to zero in expec-
tation as the market size approaches infinity.
The following example shows that even the canonical groupwise-price mechanism can
violate asymptotic budget balance.
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Example 2. Suppose m = 2, nB = nS = N , the values for each seller s is given by
v1s(t) = ts and v
2
s(t) = ts + 2, and the values for each buyer b are given by v
ℓ
b(t) = tb + 1
for both ℓ = 1, 2 (thus, agents in this example have private values).25 Note that, for each
seller, the value of her first unit of the object is in [0, 1], and the value for the second unit
is in [2, 3]. Thus, for the sellers, there is a “gap” between possible values of the first and
second units of the object.
Consider the canonical groupwise-price mechanism. By the definition of the reference
price, with a large N , it is very likely that pk is close to 1.5 for each k. The probability
that |B∗k(t)| < aB =
N
K
is bounded away from zero even if N goes to infinity. On the
other hand, the probability that |S∗k(t)| = aS =
N
K
approaches one. Thus, the probability
that the sellers in submarket k are on the long side of the market, i.e., |S∗k(t¯)| > |B
∗
k(t)|,
is bounded away from zero. In such a case, each seller who trades earns at most 1, while
each buyer who trades pays pk. Since at least a fraction of agents bounded away from
zero trade in expectation, and pk is higher than 1.5 with probability bounded away from
zero, this implies that the expected budget surplus per capita does not converge to zero
as N → ∞. That is, the canonical groupwise-price mechanism is not asymptotically
budget-balanced. 
This example shows that the groupwise-price mechanism does not necessarily achieve as-
ymptotic budget balance. However, as we present below, there are at least two approaches
that enable us to have the mechanism achieve asymptotic budget balance, thereby en-
abling each agent to asymptotically enjoy the same level of ex ante expected utility as in
a competitive equilibrium.
One solution is to randomly choose one agent independently from agents’ reports and
give all the budget surplus to that agent while prohibiting her from trading. In other
words, we can achieve asymptotic efficiency by augmenting the canonical groupwise-price
mechanism by exogenously appointing one revenue absorber. By construction, this mod-
ified mechanism is budget-balanced. Moreover, it is easy to verify that the above modifi-
cation does not invalidate any of our preceding results so all other desirable properties of
the original mechanism continue to hold.
Nevertheless, it is conceivable that a social planner does not want to use a revenue
absorber.26 This concern motivates the second solution. Let us begin by imposing an
25Although this example violates our assumptions that all valuations must lie in the unit interval and
that vℓi 6= v
ℓ′
i for each i and ℓ 6= ℓ
′, this is just for notational simplicity. We can modify the example to
satisfy these assumptions without changing the conclusion.
26For instance, agents’ payoff functions may fail to be quasi-linear (which we assume throughout the
paper) because of income effect if the monetary transfer is large. Under income effect, agents’ payoffs
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additional assumption. We say that agent valuations allow no gaps if vℓs(1, t−s) ≥
vℓ+1s (0, t−s) and v
ℓ+1
b (1, t−b) ≥ v
ℓ
b(0, t−b) for each b ∈ B, s ∈ S, ℓ ∈ {1, . . . , m − 1}, and
t ∈ [0, 1]B∪S. This assumption may be interpreted as imposing certain “smoothness”
of supply and demand functions. Note that the sellers’ valuations in Example 2 violate
this requirement. Note also that this condition is automatically satisfied if agents have
single-unit demand and supply, i.e., m = 1, as assumed in most existing studies.
Theorem 3. Suppose that agent valuations allow no gaps. Then, the canonical groupwise-
price mechanism is asymptotically budget-balanced.
Proof. See Appendix B. 
An immediate corollary of Theorems 2 and 3 is a stronger form of asymptotic efficiency.
More specifically, the ex-ante expected utility of each buyer and seller converges to the level
achieved with a competitive mechanism under truthtelling as the market size approaches
infinity.27
5. Conclusion
This paper investigated whether desirable properties can be achieved in double auc-
tion environments with value interdependence. We showed that there exists a mecha-
nism that satisfies ex post incentive compatibility, individual rationality, feasibility, non-
wastefulness, no budget deficit, and asymptotic efficiency. To our knowledge, our mech-
anism is the first double auction mechanism with these properties in the interdependent
values setting.
We do not necessarily regard our mechanism as an immediately applicable solution,
but rather as a step toward understanding what desirable properties can be achieved in
practice. In fact, there are still several important gaps between our current knowledge
and practical use. First, the social planner is assumed to know the functional form of
the agents’ payoff functions. Second, the trading prices can vary across agents under our
mechanism. Both features are shared by most mechanisms in the literature,28 but they
may exhibit risk aversion, and hence randomly awarding one agent with a large amount of money may
be inefficient.
27Strictly speaking, the statement of Theorem 3 merely states that the aggregate budget surplus per
capita vanishes, and is silent about the distribution of transfer across different agents. However, the
proof of the theorem reveals that each agent’s transfer converges to its competitive level. This fact and
Theorem 2 imply this corollary.
28Even in the one-sided auction under private values, VCG payments can vary across agents with
multi-unit demand. In the interdependent values setting, the mechanism by Ausubel (1999) shares this
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may pose challenges in some applications. We hope that our analysis stimulates future
studies aimed at practical applications.
In addition, there are a number of possible directions of future research. One possibility
is to examine the speed of convergence (i.e., how quickly efficiency is approximated) in
more detail, or the possibility of a stronger form of asymptotic efficiency (e.g., whether
efficiency in the “absolute term” is possible, rather than in the “per-capita term” as in
this paper). These issues appear to be technically challenging exercises.29 We leave them
as topics for future research.
Another direction is to consider more general environments, such as those with mul-
tidimensional signals,30 multiple types of objects, complementarity in agents’ valuations,
dispensing with the assumption that each agent is predetermined to be a buyer or a
seller (that is, allowing agents to buy or sell depending on signals and prices), and so on.
Generalizations in these directions are not straightforward, and we leave them for future
research. However, we believe that some intuitions obtained in our study may be useful
in designing desirable mechanisms in these more general environments.
feature, and it presumes the knowledge of the social planner about the payoff functions. Note, however,
important advance such as Perry and Reny (2002) who implement a desired outcome as an equilibrium
of a game whose form does not depend on the functional form of the payoff functions.
29Measuring efficiency in the per-capita term is standard in the literature, especially with interdepen-
dence. For example, see Reny and Perry (2006) for double auction, Vives (2002) for Cournot oligopoly,
and Lee and Yariv (2014) for matching.
30In the one-sided, object allocation setting, a recent contribution by Hashimoto (2013) obtains positive
results even with multi-dimensional signals. Although there does not appear to be an obvious way to
adapt his idea to our double-auction setting, studying multidimensional signals in double auction would
be an important future research.
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Appendix A. Proof of Theorem 2
We prove the theorem in three steps. In the first step, we prove the result under the
assumption that each agent’s type is drawn i.i.d. according to the uniform distribution.
In the second step, we build on this result to establish the desired result for the case
with more general type distributions while retaining the i.i.d. assumption. In the last
step, we use this result to obtain the desired result for the general case of conditionally
independent types.
A.1. Proof for the uniform distribution case. In this subsection, we prove the result
under the assumption that each agent’s type is drawn i.i.d. according to the uniform
distribution.
Lemma 1 shows that, by a law of large numbers, the sup-norm distance between the
empirical cdf of types and the true cdf of types in each submarket k is small in an event
that occurs with a high probability. Focusing on that event, Lemmas 2 to 5 evaluate
how many efficiency-enhancing trades are left unrealized. Building on these lemmas, we
complete the proof by bounding the overall expected efficiency loss.
We first look at each submarket k. Let Λ = K, and consider λ ∈ {1, . . . ,Λ}.
Let
xλk =
{
s ∈ Sk|ts ≤
λ
Λ
−
1
K
}
,
xλk =
{
s ∈ Sk|ts ≥
λ
Λ
+
1
K
}
,
yλ
k
=
{
b ∈ Bk|tb ≤
λ
Λ
−
1
K
}
,
yλk =
{
b ∈ Bk|tb ≥
λ
Λ
+
1
K
}
,
and
Xλk =
|xλk |
aS
,
X
λ
k =
|xλk |
aS
,
Y λk =
|yλ
k
|
aB
,
Y
λ
k =
|yλk|
aB
,
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where aS =
nS
K
, aB =
nB
K
. Each of Xλk , X
λ
k , Y
λ
k , and Y
λ
k is a binomially distributed variable,
with means and variances as follows.
E(Xλk) = E(Y
λ
k) =
λ
Λ
−
1
K
,
E(X
λ
k) = E(Y
λ
k) = 1−
λ
Λ
−
1
K
,
V (Xλk), V (X
λ
k) ≤
1
4aS
,
V (Y λk), V (Y
λ
k) ≤
1
4aB
.
Let Ek be the event that all of the following four inequalities hold,∣∣∣∣Xλk −
(
λ
Λ
−
1
K
)∣∣∣∣ < 12K ,∣∣∣∣Xλk −
(
1−
λ
Λ
−
1
K
)∣∣∣∣ < 12K ,∣∣∣∣Y λk −
(
λ
Λ
−
1
K
)∣∣∣∣ < 12K ,∣∣∣∣Y λk −
(
1−
λ
Λ
−
1
K
)∣∣∣∣ < 12K ,
for every λ ∈ {1, . . . ,Λ}. Note that, given event Ek, X
λ+1
k −X
λ
k > 0 by the assumption
Λ = K (and similarly for Xk, Y k, Y k).
By Chebyshev’s inequality, we obtain the following.
Lemma 1. Pr(Ek) > 1−
2ΛK2
aS
− 2ΛK
2
aB
.
Proof. By Chebyshev’s inequality, for each λ,
Pr
(∣∣∣∣Xλk −
(
λ
Λ
−
1
K
)∣∣∣∣ > η
)
<
1
4aSη2
,
Pr
(∣∣∣∣Xλk −
(
1−
λ
Λ
−
1
K
)∣∣∣∣ > η
)
<
1
4aSη2
,
Pr
(∣∣∣∣Y λk −
(
λ
Λ
−
1
K
)∣∣∣∣ > η
)
<
1
4aBη2
,
Pr
(∣∣∣∣Y λk −
(
1−
λ
Λ
−
1
K
)∣∣∣∣ > η
)
<
1
4aBη2
,
where η = 1
2K
. Because the probability of the union of events is weakly smaller than the
sum of the probabilities of those events by Boole’s inequality, these inequalities imply that
Pr(Ek) > 1−
Λ
2aSη2
− Λ
2aBη2
. Substituting in η = 1
2K
, we obtain the desired conclusion. 
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Now, consider the event F that vℓi (t) 6= v
ℓ′
j (t) for every ℓ, ℓ
′, i, j such that ℓ 6= ℓ′ or
i 6= j. Because types are drawn i.i.d. from the uniform distribution on [0, 1], F is a
probability one event. From this and the fact that there are K submarkets, we have
Pr(E) > 1− 2ΛK
3
aS
− 2ΛK
3
aB
= 1− 2ΛK
4
nS
− 2ΛK
4
nB
, where E := (
⋂
k Ek) ∩ F . Thus, if
ΛK4
nS
and
ΛK4
nB
converge to zero as N goes to infinity, this probability converges to one.
We observe that the overall type distributions satisfy similar properties. Let
xλ =
{
s ∈ S|ts ≤
λ
Λ
−
1
K
}
,
xλ =
{
s ∈ S|ts ≥
λ
Λ
+
1
K
}
,
yλ =
{
b ∈ B|tb ≤
λ
Λ
−
1
K
}
,
yλ =
{
b ∈ B|tb ≥
λ
Λ
+
1
K
}
,
and
Xλ =
|xλ|
nS
,
X
λ
=
|xλ|
nS
,
Y λ =
|yλ|
nB
,
Y
λ
=
|yλ|
nB
.
Lemma 2. Given that E has occurred, we have∣∣∣∣Xλ −
(
λ
Λ
−
1
K
)∣∣∣∣ < 12K ,∣∣∣∣Xλ −
(
1−
λ
Λ
−
1
K
)∣∣∣∣ < 12K ,∣∣∣∣Y λ −
(
λ
Λ
−
1
K
)∣∣∣∣ < 12K ,∣∣∣∣Y λ −
(
1−
λ
Λ
−
1
K
)∣∣∣∣ < 12K ,
for every λ ∈ {1, . . . ,Λ}.
Proof. Given that Ek has occurred,
Xλk ∈
(
λ
Λ
−
3
2K
,
λ
Λ
−
1
2K
)
.
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Thus, given that E =
⋂
k Ek has occurred,
Xλ =
1
nS
K∑
k=1
(aSX
λ
k) ∈
(
λ
Λ
−
3
2K
,
λ
Λ
−
1
2K
)
.
We obtain the desired conclusions about X
λ
, Y λ, and Y
λ
by symmetric arguments. 
Given reported t, let v
(q)
B be the q-th highest value among {v
ℓ
b(t)}b∈B,ℓ, and v
(q)
S be the
q-th lowest value among {vℓs(t)}s∈S,ℓ. Let p
MC be a market-clearing price, defined as
pMC = min
{
v
(q)
B , v
(q+1)
S
}
,
where q is an integer such that v
(q)
S ≤ v
(q)
B and v
(q+1)
S > v
(q+1)
B .
31
Let sℓ (bℓ) denote the seller (the buyer) who has the highest (lowest) type among those
trading at least ℓ units under pMC .32
By symmetry among sellers, each type of the seller with t < tsℓ sells at least ℓ units
under pMC , and similarly for the buyers (we set tsℓ = 0 (tbℓ = 1) if no seller type (buyer
type) trades at least ℓ units).33 Let λℓB and λ
ℓ
S be integers such that tbℓ ∈
[
λℓB
Λ
,
λℓB+1
Λ
)
and
tsℓ ∈
[
λℓS−1
Λ
,
λℓS
Λ
)
.
In the remainder of the proof, we show that the level of trades approaches an efficient
level as N → ∞, implying that per-capita inefficiency caused by failed trades converges
to zero. By ex ante symmetry across buyers and across sellers, this suffices for the proof
of the theorem. We begin with the following lemma, which shows that the reference price
pk for each submarket k is close to the market clearing price p
MC .
Lemma 3. Given that E has occurred, pk ∈
[
pMC , pMC + ( 2
K
+ 4
Λ
)β ′ + 2α
K
]
for each k.
Proof. Let D0 and S0 be the demand and supply under the true type profile at price p
MC ,
and let D′(p) and S ′(p) be the demand and supply under the modified type profile (i.e.,
tˆk = ((ti)i/∈(Sk∪Bk), (1)i∈(Sk∪Bk))) at price p, respectively. Formally, define
D0 = #{(b, ℓ) ∈ B × {1, . . . , m}|v
ℓ
b(t) ≥ p
MC},
S0 = #{(s, ℓ) ∈ S × {1, . . . , m}|v
ℓ
s(t) < p
MC},
D′(p) = #{(b, ℓ) ∈ B × {1, . . . , m}|vℓb(tˆk) ≥ p},
S ′(p) = #{(s, ℓ) ∈ S × {1, . . . , m}|vℓs(tˆk) < p}.
31If v
(q)
S ≤ v
(q)
B for all q, then we set p
MC = v
(mnB)
B . If v
(q)
S > v
(q)
B for all q, then we set p
MC = v
(1)
S .
32Hence, for example, if there is no type of the seller who trades exactly two units, we have ts2 = ts3 .
33Recall that no two buyers or sellers have the same type with each other under event E.
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Because the demand under the modified type profile is weakly larger than the one under
the true type profile, we have D′(pMC) ≥ D0 at price p
MC . On the other hand, the supply
under the modified type profile is weakly smaller, and hence S ′(pMC) ≤ S0. Hence, we
have D′(pMC) ≥ D0 = S0 ≥ S
′(pMC), which implies that pk is no smaller than p
MC .
In the rest of this proof, we shall show
pk ≤ p¯k := p
MC +
(
2
K
+
4
Λ
)
β ′ +
2α
K
.(A.1)
In the following, we first show that S ′(p˜k) ≥ S0 = D0 ≥ D
′(p˜k), where
p˜k = p
MC +
(
2
K
+
3
Λ
)
β ′ +
2α
K
= p¯k −
β ′
Λ
.
Then, we show that this implies the desired inequality (A.1).
We first consider sellers. For each ℓ, define Sℓ(p˜k) = |{s ∈ S|v
ℓ
s(tˆk) < p˜k}| and S
ℓ
0 =
|{s ∈ S|vℓs(t) < p
MC}|. We shall show that Sℓ(p˜k) ≥ S
ℓ
0. To show this, consider the
following cases.
(1) Suppose Sℓ0 = 0. Then trivially S
ℓ(p˜k) ≥ S
ℓ
0.
(2) Suppose Sℓ(p˜k) = nS. Then trivially S
ℓ(p˜k) ≥ S
ℓ
0.
(3) Suppose Sℓ0 > 0 and S
ℓ(p˜k) < nS. We first show the following claim.
Claim 1. Suppose Sℓ0 > 0 and S
ℓ(p˜k) < nS. Then λ
ℓ
S(p
MC) < Λ− 1− 2Λ
K
.
Proof. Suppose for contradiction that λℓS(p
MC) ≥ Λ − 1 − 2Λ
K
. Take s′ ∈ S as
the seller whose type is the highest among the sellers s with vℓs(t) < p
MC . Then
ts′ ≥
λℓ
S
(pMC)−1
Λ
; Note that such a seller s′ exists because of the assumption Sℓ0 > 0.
Consider the following cases.
(a) Suppose s′ /∈ Sk. In this case, for any s˜ ∈ Sk, we have
vℓs˜(tˆk) ≤ v
ℓ
s′(tˆk) + β
′(1− ts′)
≤ vℓs′(t) + β
′(1− ts′) +
2α
K
< pMC + β ′
(
1−
λℓS(p
MC)− 1
Λ
)
+
2α
K
≤ pMC + β ′
(
1−
Λ− 1− 2Λ
K
− 1
Λ
)
+
2α
K
= pMC + β ′
(
2
Λ
+
2
K
)
+
2α
K
≤ p˜k.
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Because the modified type for s˜ ∈ Sk at tˆk is the highest possible type by the
definition of tˆk, the above inequality implies S
ℓ(p˜k) = nS, a contradiction.
(b) Suppose s′ ∈ Sk. In this case, we have
34
vℓs′(tˆk) ≤ v
ℓ
s′(t) + β
′(1− ts′) +
2α
K
< pMC + β ′
(
1−
λℓS(p
MC)− 1
Λ
)
+
2α
K
≤ pMC + β ′
(
1−
Λ− 1− 2Λ
K
− 1
Λ
)
+
2α
K
= pMC + β ′
(
2
Λ
+
2
K
)
+
2α
K
≤ p˜k.
Thus, we obtain Sℓ(p˜k) = nS, a contradiction.

To prove the desired conclusion Sℓ(p˜k) ≥ S
ℓ
0 for this case, let s ∈ S be the seller
whose type is the lowest among those with vℓs(tˆk) ≥ p˜k; Note that such a seller s
exists because Sℓ(p˜k) < nS. Consider the following cases.
(a) Suppose s /∈ Sk. Let λˆ
ℓ
S(p˜k) be an integer such that the interval
[
λˆℓ
S
(p˜k)−1
Λ
,
λˆℓ
S
(p˜k)
Λ
)
contains the type of the seller whose valuation at tˆk is the highest among those
whose value at tˆk is lower than p˜k. By event E, we have ts ∈
[
λˆℓS(p˜k)−1
Λ
,
λˆℓS(p˜k)+1
Λ
)
.
34The first inequality of the display inequalities below is obtained as follows: letting s /∈ Sk be an
arbitrary seller outside Sk,
vℓs′(tˆk) = v
ℓ
s′(1, (1)sˆ∈(Sk∪Bk)\{s′}, (tsˆ)sˆ /∈(Sk∪Bk))
≤ vℓs′(1, ts′ , t−s,s′) +
(
aS − 1
nS
+
aB
nB
)
α
≤ vℓs(1, ts′ , t−s,s′) +
(
aS − 1
nS
+
aB
nB
)
α+ β′(1− ts′)
≤ vℓs(ts, ts′ , t−s,s′) +
2α
K
+ β′(1− ts′)
= vℓs′(ts′ , ts, t−s,s′) +
2α
K
+ β′(1− ts′)
= vℓs′(t) +
2α
K
+ β′(1− ts′).
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Then, we have
1
nS
(Sℓ(p˜k)− S
ℓ
0) >
1
nS
((
λˆℓS(p˜k)− 1
Λ
−
1
2K
)
nS − aS −
(
λℓS(p
MC)
Λ
+
1
2K
)
nS
)
≥
λˆℓS(p˜k)− λ
ℓ
S(p
MC)− 1
Λ
−
2
K
≥
vℓs(tˆk)− v
ℓ
s′(t)−
2α
K
β ′
−
3
Λ
−
2
K
>
p˜k − p
MC − 2α
K
β ′
−
3
Λ
−
2
K
= 0.
(b) Suppose s ∈ Sk. In this case, S
ℓ(p˜k) ≥ nS − aS = nS
(
1− 1
K
)
and Sℓ0 <(
λℓS(p
MC)
Λ
+ 1
2K
)
nS, and thus, S
ℓ(p˜k) > S
ℓ
0 if
1−
1
K
>
λℓS(p
MC)
Λ
+
1
2K
,
or 1−
λℓS(p
MC)
Λ
> 3
2K
. This inequality is satisfied because λℓS(p
MC) < Λ−1− 2Λ
K
by Claim 1, and hence 1−
λℓS(p
MC)
Λ
> 1
Λ
+ 2
K
> 3
2K
.
Hence we have shown that Sℓ(p˜k) ≥ S
ℓ
0 for each ℓ. Therefore S
′(p˜k) =
∑m
ℓ=1 S
ℓ(p˜k) ≥∑m
ℓ=1 S
ℓ
0 = S0. By an analogous argument, we obtain D
′(p˜k) ≤ D0. Therefore S
′(p˜k) ≥
S0 = D0 ≥ D
′(p˜k). To complete the proof, consider the following cases.
(1) Suppose D0 > 0. Then, because S ′(p¯k) ≥ S
′(p˜k) ≥ D
0, it follows that S ′(p¯k) > 0.
If D′(p˜k) = 0, then because D
′(p˜k) ≥ D
′(p¯k), it follows that D
′(p¯k) = 0, and hence
S ′(p¯k) > D
′(p¯k), as desired. If D
′(p˜k) > 0, then since p¯k = p˜k +
β′
Λ
, under event
E, D′(p˜k) > D
′(p¯k). Therefore we have S
′(p¯k) ≥ S
′(p˜k) ≥ D
′(p˜k) > D
′(p¯k), as
desired.
(2) Suppose D0 = 0. Then, by definition of pMC , it follows that pMC = v
(1)
S . Because
vˆ
(1)
S ≤ v
(1)
S +
2α
K
, we obtain that p¯k > vˆ
(1)
S , which implies S
′(p¯k) > 0. Because
D0 ≥ D′(p˜k) ≥ D
′(p¯k) from an earlier argument, it follows that D
′(p¯k) = 0.
Therefore S ′(p¯k) > 0 = D
′(p¯k), as desired.

Lemma 4. Assume E holds. In the canonical groupwise-price mechanism, at least
min
{
nB
∑
ℓ
[
1−
λℓB
Λ
]
, nS
∑
ℓ
λℓS
Λ
}
−max{nB, nS}m
[(
2
K
+ 4
Λ
)
β ′ + 3α
K
β
+
2
Λ
+
1
2K
]
units of the object are traded.
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Proof. For each b ∈ Bk and ℓ ∈ {1, . . . , m}, let v˜
ℓ
b := v
ℓ
b(t) = v
ℓ
b((0)i∈Sk , t−Sk). If (b, ℓ)
satisfies v˜ℓb ≥ pk, then (b, ℓ) ∈ B
∗
k(t). Because
v˜ℓb ≥ v
ℓ
b(t)− aS ·
α
nS
= vℓb(t)−
α
K
,
if
vℓb(t)−
α
K
≥ p¯k,(A.2)
then v˜ℓb ≥ pk, and hence (b, ℓ) ∈ B
∗
k(t).
Let λℓ be the smallest nonnegative integer that satisfies
λℓ ≥ Λ
[(
2
K
+ 4
Λ
)
β ′ + 3α
K
β
+
λℓB + 1
Λ
−
1
K
]
.(A.3)
Then, by rearranging terms,
λℓ
Λ
+
1
K
−
λℓB + 1
Λ
≥
(
2
K
+ 4
Λ
)
β ′ + 3α
K
β
.
Consider an arbitrary buyer b ∈ yλ
ℓ
k . Using the above inequality, and noting that tb ≥ tbℓ
because tb ≥
λℓ
Λ
+ 1
K
≥
λℓ
B
+1
Λ
≥ tbℓ , we obtain that
vℓb(t)−
α
K
≥ vℓbℓ(t) + β(tb − t
ℓ
b)−
α
K
≥ pMC + β
(
λℓ
Λ
+
1
K
−
λℓB + 1
Λ
)
−
α
K
≥ pMC +
(
2
K
+
4
Λ
)
β ′ +
3α
K
−
α
K
= pMC +
(
2
K
+
4
Λ
)
β ′ +
2α
K
= p¯k,
thus (b, ℓ) ∈ B∗k(t). So we obtain
|B∗k(t)| ≥ aB
∑
ℓ
Y
λℓ
k ≥
∑
ℓ
aB
[
1−
λℓ
Λ
−
3
2K
]
.(A.4)
Because λℓ is defined as the smallest integer satisfying (A.3), we have
λℓ ≤ Λ
[
( 2
K
+ 4
Λ
)β ′ + 3α
K
β
+
λℓB + 1
Λ
−
1
K
]
+ 1.
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Substituting this inequality to inequality (A.4), we obtain
|B∗k(t)| ≥
∑
ℓ
aB
[
1−
[(
2
K
+ 4
Λ
)
β ′ + 3α
K
β
+
λℓB + 1
Λ
−
1
K
]
−
1
Λ
−
3
2K
]
=
∑
ℓ
aB
[
1−
λℓB
Λ
−
(
2
K
+ 4
Λ
)
β ′ + 3α
K
β
−
2
Λ
−
1
2K
]
.
For each s ∈ Sk and ℓ ∈ {1, . . . , m}, let v˜
ℓ
s := v
ℓ
s(t) = v
ℓ
s(ts, (1)i∈Bk , t−Bk). If (s, ℓ)
satisfies v˜ℓs < pk, then (s, ℓ) ∈ S
∗
k(t). Because
v˜ℓs ≤ v
ℓ
s(t) + aB ·
α
nB
= vℓs(t) +
α
K
,
if
vℓs(t) +
α
K
< pMC ,(A.5)
then v˜ℓs < pk, and hence (s, ℓ) ∈ S
∗
k(t).
Let λℓ be defined as the largest integer such that
λℓ ≤ λℓS − 1−
αΛ
βK
+
Λ
K
.(A.6)
Then, by rearranging terms,
λℓ
Λ
−
1
K
−
λℓS
Λ
≤ −
1
Λ
−
α
βK
.
Consider an arbitrary seller s ∈ xλ
ℓ
k . Using the above equality, and noting ts < tsℓ (because
ts <
λℓ
Λ
− 1
K
≤
λℓS−1
Λ
− α
βK
<
λℓS−1
Λ
≤ tsℓ), we obtain
vℓs(t) +
α
K
≤ vℓsℓ(t)− β(tsℓ − ts) +
α
K
≤ vℓsℓ(t)− β
(
λℓS − 1
Λ
−
(
λℓ
Λ
−
1
K
))
+
α
K
≤ vℓsℓ(t)−
α
K
+
α
K
< pMC ,
thus showing that relation (A.5) holds, and hence (s, ℓ) ∈ S∗k(t). So we obtain
|S∗k(t)| ≥ aS
∑
ℓ
Xλ
ℓ
k ≥
∑
ℓ
aS
[
λℓ
Λ
−
3
2K
]
.(A.7)
Because λℓ is defined as the largest integer satisfying (A.6), we have
λℓ ≥ λℓS − 1−
αΛ
βK
+
Λ
K
− 1,(A.8)
32 FUHITO KOJIMA AND TAKURO YAMASHITA
so
λℓ
Λ
≥
λℓS
Λ
−
α
βK
−
2
Λ
+
1
K
,(A.9)
Substituting this inequality into inequality (A.7), we obtain
|S∗k(t)| ≥
∑
ℓ
aS
[
λℓS
Λ
−
α
βK
−
2
Λ
−
1
2K
]
.
Therefore, the number of trades in submarket k is at least
min
{
aB
∑
ℓ
[
1−
λℓB
Λ
−
(
2
K
+ 4
Λ
)
β ′ + 3α
K
β
−
2
Λ
−
1
2K
]
, aS
∑
ℓ
[
λℓS
Λ
−
α
βK
−
2
Λ
−
1
2K
]}
.
Summing across all submarkets (and noting that this lower bound does not depend on
k), there are at least
min
{
nB
∑
ℓ
[
1−
λℓB
Λ
−
(
2
K
+ 4
Λ
)
β ′ + 3α
K
β
−
2
Λ
−
1
2K
]
, nS
∑
ℓ
[
λℓS
Λ
−
α
βK
−
2
Λ
−
1
2K
]}
≥ min
{
nB
∑
ℓ
[
1−
λℓB
Λ
]
, nS
∑
ℓ
λℓS
Λ
}
+max{nB, nS}m
[
−
(
2
K
+ 4
Λ
)
β ′ + 3α
K
β
−
2
Λ
−
1
2K
]
,
trades under our double auction mechanism.35 
Lemma 5. Assume E holds. In the efficient allocation, under pMC, at most
min
{
nB
∑
ℓ
[
1−
λℓB
Λ
]
, nS
∑
ℓ
λℓS
Λ
}
+max{nB, nS}
3m
2K
units are traded.
Proof. First, consider the buyers. By definition, if buyer b satisfies
tb <
λℓB
Λ
=
(λℓB +
Λ
K
)
Λ
−
1
K
,
or equivalently, if b ∈ yλ
ℓ
B+
Λ
K , then b does not trade her ℓ-th unit in the efficient trade. The
number of such buyers b is nBY
λℓ
B
+ Λ
K , which we know is no smaller than nB
(
λℓ
B
Λ
− 3
2K
)
.
Therefore the number of the buyers who buy their ℓ-th units of the object is bounded
from above by nB
(
1−
λℓB
Λ
+ 3
2K
)
.
Next, consider the sellers. By definition, if seller s satisfies
ts >
λℓS
Λ
=
(λℓS −
Λ
K
)
Λ
+
1
K
,
35Note that
( 2K+
4
Λ )β
′+ 3α
K
β ≥
3α
βK ≥
α
βK .
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or equivalently, if s ∈ xλ
ℓ
S−
Λ
K , then s does not trade her ℓ-th unit in the efficient trade. The
number of such sellers s is nSX
λℓ
S
− Λ
K , which we know is no smaller than nS
(
1−
λℓ
S
Λ
− 3
2K
)
.
Therefore the number of the sellers who buy their ℓ-th units of the object is bounded from
above by nS
(
λℓ
S
Λ
+ 3
2K
)
.
Therefore the number of trades is at most
min
{
nB
∑
ℓ
(
1−
λℓB
Λ
+
3
2K
)
, nS
∑
ℓ
(
λℓS
Λ
+
3
2K
)}
≤ min
{
nB
∑
ℓ
[
1−
λℓB
Λ
]
, nS
∑
ℓ
λℓS
Λ
}
+max{nB, nS}
3m
2K
,
which completes the proof.

Now we shall complete the proof of the Theorem. By Lemmata 4 and 5, the “per-capita”
welfare loss for buyers is bounded from above by
(A.10)
1
nB
[
Pr(E)
{[
min
{
nB
∑
ℓ
[
1−
λℓB
Λ
]
, nS
∑
ℓ
λℓS
Λ
}
+max{nB, nS}
3m
2K
]
−
[
min
{
nB
∑
ℓ
[
1−
λℓB
Λ
]
, nS
∑
ℓ
λℓS
Λ
}
+max{nB, nS}m
[
−
(
2
K
+ 4
Λ
)
β ′ + 3α
K
β
−
2
Λ
−
1
2K
]]}
+(1− Pr(E))mnB
]
≤
1
nB
(
mmax{nB, nS}
[
3
2K
+
( 2
K
+ 4
Λ
)β ′ + 3α
K
β
+
2
Λ
+
1
2K
]
+
[
2ΛK4
nS
+
2ΛK4
nB
]
×mnB
)
≤
γm
γ
[
3
2K
+
( 2
K
+ 4
Λ
)β ′ + 3α
K
β
+
2
Λ
+
1
2K
]
+
[
2mΛK4
nS
+
2mΛK4
nB
]
,
where the first inequality follows because Pr(E) ≤ 1 (since Pr(E) is a probability) and (1−
Pr(E)) is bounded from above by replacing Pr(E) with its lower bound, 1− 2ΛK
4
nS
− 2ΛK
4
nB
,
while the second inequality comes from simplifying terms. Because Λ = K, K → ∞,
K5
N
→ 0 as N → ∞, and γN < nB, nS < γN for all N by assumption, the right-most
expression of inequality (A.10) approaches zero as N → ∞. This implies that the per-
capita inefficiency for buyers from failed trades also approaches zero as N → ∞. A
symmetric argument shows that the per-capita inefficiency for sellers from failed trades
approaches zero as N →∞, completing the proof under the assumption that each agent’s
type is drawn i.i.d. according to the uniform distribution.
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A.2. Proof for the general independent type case. In this subsection, suppose that
all types are independently distributed, and each buyer’s type follows a distribution with
cdf F with an everywhere positive and continuous pdf f while each seller’s type follows a
distribution with cdf G with an everywhere positive and continuous pdf g. We shall show
that the conclusion of the theorem holds under these assumptions.
To show the result for this case, first note that F and G admit inverse functions F−1 and
G−1, and τb = F (tb) and τs = G(ts) follow the uniform distribution over [0, 1]. For each
τ = (τj)j∈B∪S, define v˜i(τ) = vi((F
−1(τb))b∈B, (G
−1(τs))s∈S) as the new valuation function
of agent i. Given that vi(·) satisfies conditions (4.1) and (4.2), the valuation function
v˜i(·) satisfies the same conditions too, as shown in the next paragraph. Therefore, the
conclusion of the theorem holds by the analysis in Subsection A.1.
It remains to show that v˜i(·) satisfies conditions (4.1) and (4.2). To see this, let f, f ∈
(0,∞) be such that f(τb) ∈ [f, f ] for all τb ∈ [0, 1] and g, g ∈ (0,∞) be such that
g(τs) ∈ [g, g] for all τs ∈ [0, 1] (note that f and g are strictly positive and continuous on
[0, 1], so such f, f, g, and g exist). Then, for each i and j 6= i,
|v˜ℓi (τ−j, τj)− v˜
ℓ
i (τ−j , τ
′
j)| ≤
f−1α
nB
, if j ∈ B,
|v˜ℓi (τ−j , τj)− v˜
ℓ
i (τ−j , τ
′
j)| ≤
g−1α
nS
, if j ∈ S,
thus condition (4.1) is satisfied, and
|v˜ℓi (τ)− v˜
ℓ
j(τ)| ∈ [βf
−1
|τi − τj |, β
′f−1|τi − τj |] if i, j ∈ B,
|v˜ℓi (τ)− v˜
ℓ
j(τ)| ∈ [βg
−1|τi − τj |, β
′g−1|τi − τj|] if i, j ∈ S,
thus condition (4.2) is satisfied.
A.3. Proof for the general conditional independence case. Finally, we will com-
plete the proof for the general conditionally independent type as assumed in the main text
of the paper. To do so, recall that there is a state variable σ that is drawn randomly from
a certain finite distribution. For each realization of σ, there is a pair of type distributions,
one for the buyers and another for the sellers, and types are independently distributed
conditional on σ. It is clear that the expected efficiency loss in this model is simply a
weighted average of expected inefficiencies conditional on σ. Because the proof in Subsec-
tion A.2 shows that expected inefficiency goes to zero for any fixed σ, we conclude that
the expected inefficiency that is averaged over the state variables also converges to zero.
This completes the proof of the theorem.
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Remark 3. While the rate of convergence to efficiency is not our main focus, our proof
sheds light on this issue. For that purpose, first recall that Λ = K. This and the last
inequality imply that the expected per-capita inefficiency in the canonical groupwise-price
mechanism is O
(
1
K
+ K
5
N
)
. By taking K = N
1
6 , this is O
(
N−
1
6
)
. In particular, a canon-
ical groupwise-price mechanism can diminish the per-capita inefficiency at a polynomial
rate in N . Whether a mechanism with a better convergence rate exists is an open question.
Appendix B. Proof of Theorem 3
In this section, we prove Theorem 3 under the assumption that each agent’s type is
drawn i.i.d. according to the uniform distribution. Extension to the general case of
conditionally independent types is omitted because the argument is analogous to the one
for Theorem 2, which is presented in Subsections A.2 and A.3.
In the following, we fix one realization of type profile t under event E. Let
[
λℓ
S
(p)−1
Λ
,
λℓ
S
(p)
Λ
)
be the interval that contains the highest type of the sellers in S whose ℓ-th unit value
given t is smaller than or equal to p. Similarly, let
[
λℓ
B
(p)
Λ
,
λℓ
B
(p)+1
Λ
)
be the interval that
contains the lowest type of the buyers in B whose ℓ-th unit value given t is higher than
or equal to p.
Also, we use the following notation.
AλS =
1
nS
∣∣∣∣
{
s ∈ S|ts ≤
λ
Λ
}∣∣∣∣ ,
AλB =
1
nB
∣∣∣∣
{
b ∈ B|tb ≤
λ
Λ
}∣∣∣∣ .
Under event E, AλS, A
λ
B ∈
(
λ
Λ
− 1
2K
, λ
Λ
+ 1
2K
)
.
At a fixed submarket k, we introduce analogous notation. Let
[
λℓ
Sk
(p)−1
Λ
,
λℓ
Sk
(p)
Λ
)
be the
interval that contains the highest type of the sellers in Sk whose ℓ-th unit value given t¯
is smaller than or equal to p. Similarly, let
[
λℓBk
(p)
Λ
,
λℓ
B
(p)+1
Λ
)
be the interval that contains
the lowest type of the buyers in Bk whose ℓ-th unit value given t is higher than or equal
to p. Also, let
AλSk =
1
aS
∣∣∣∣
{
s ∈ Sk|ts ≤
λ
Λ
}∣∣∣∣ ,
AλBk =
1
aB
∣∣∣∣
{
b ∈ Bk|tb ≤
λ
Λ
}∣∣∣∣ .
Under event E, AλSk , A
λ
Bk
∈
(
λ
Λ
− 1
2K
, λ
Λ
+ 1
2K
)
. Let Sk(p) and Dk(p) denote the supply
and demand functions in submarket k, i.e., Sk(p) = |{(s, ℓ)|v
ℓ
s(t¯) < p}|, and Dk(p) =
|{(b, ℓ)|vℓb(t) ≥ p}|.
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Lemma 6. Let
qk = p
MC + β ′
(
3
Λ
+
1
K
)
+
α
K
,
q
k
= pMC − β ′
(
3
Λ
+
1
K
)
−
α
K
.
Then, Sk(qk) > Dk(qk) and Dk(qk) > Sk(qk).
Proof. We first show Sk(qk) > Dk(qk). To do so, for any ℓ, let Sk
ℓ(qk) be the number of
the sellers who supply their ℓ’th unit at qk, corresponding to Sk(qk). Similarly, let S
ℓ
0 be
the number of the sellers who supply their ℓ’th unit at pMC , corresponding to S0. Then,
for any given ℓ,
(1) Suppose that vℓs(t) ≤ qk for all s. Then every seller in Sk supplies her ℓ’th unit at
price q¯k. So
1
aS
Sℓk(qk)−
1
nS
Sℓ0 = 1−
1
nS
Sℓ0 ≥ 0.
(2) Suppose that vℓs(t) ≥ p
MC for all s. Then no seller in S supplies her ℓ’th unit at
price pMC . So
1
aS
Sℓk(qk)−
1
nS
Sℓ0 =
1
aS
Sℓk(qk)− 0 ≥ 0.
(3) Suppose that neither of the above cases holds. Let s be the seller whose type is
the lowest among those in submarket k with vℓs(t) > qk, and s
′ ∈ S be the seller
whose type is the highest among those in the entire market with vℓs′(t) < p
MC
(such s and s′ exist by the assumption of this case). Then,
ts′ ≥
λℓS(p
MC)− 1
Λ
.(B.1)
Depending on the realization t, ts is either in
[
λℓSk
(qk)−1
Λ
,
λℓSk
(qk)
Λ
)
or
[
λℓSk
(qk)
Λ
,
λℓSk
(qk)+1
Λ
)
.
Hence, ts ≤
λℓ
Sk
(qk)+1
Λ
. Thus,
qk − p
MC < vℓs(t)− v
ℓ
s′(t)
≤ vℓs(t)− v
ℓ
s′(t) +
α
K
≤ β ′
λℓSk(qk)− λ
ℓ
S(p
MC) + 2
Λ
+
α
K
,
which implies
β ′
(
3
Λ
+
1
K
)
+
α
K
≤ β ′
λℓSk(qk)− λ
ℓ
S(p
MC) + 2
Λ
+
α
K
,
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or equivalently
λℓSk(qk)− λ
ℓ
S(p
MC)− 1
Λ
≥
1
K
.
This implies
1
aS
Sℓk(qk)−
1
nS
Sℓ0 ≥
1
K
> 0.
By the conclusions of the above cases,
1
aS
Sk(qk)−
1
nS
S0 =
∑
ℓ
1
aS
Sℓk(qk)−
1
nS
Sℓ0 > 0,
thus we obtain 1
aS
Sk(qk) >
1
nS
S0. With an analogous argument, we can show
1
nS
D0 >
1
aS
Dk(qk) as well. These inequalities, together with the relation S0 = D0, imply the
desired conclusion, Sk(qk) > Dk(qk).
The proof for Dk(qk) > Sk(qk) is analogous and hence omitted. 
The following lemma is useful for the rest of the proof.
Lemma 7. Let p′ ≥ p be prices such that there exist two buyers b, b′ ∈ Bk where v
1
b (t) > p
′
and vmb′ (t) < p, and moreover, there exist two sellers s, s
′ ∈ Sk where v
1
s(t) < p and
vms′ (t) > p
′. Then,
Sk(p
′)− Sk(p) ∈
(
aS
(
p′ − p
β ′
−
3 + 2m
Λ
−
1
K
−
3αm
β ′nS
)
, aSm
(
p′ − p
β
+
3
Λ
+
1
K
))
,
Dk(p)−Dk(p
′) ∈
(
aB
(
p′ − p
β ′
−
3 + 2m
Λ
−
1
K
−
3αm
β ′nB
)
, aBm
(
p′ − p
β
+
3
Λ
+
1
K
))
.
Proof. Let s ∈ Sk be the seller who has the lowest type in Sk, and s ∈ Sk be the seller
who has the highest type in Sk.
Proof for a lower bound for Sk(·). We consider the following two cases. First, suppose
that there exists ℓ ∈ {1, . . . , m} such that vℓs(t) < p ≤ p
′ ≤ vℓs(t). Let s ∈ Sk be the seller
in submarket k whose type is the highest among those with vℓs(t) < p. Then,
ts ≥
λℓSk(p)− 1
Λ
.(B.2)
Similarly, let s′ ∈ Sk be the seller in submarket k whose type is the lowest among those
with vℓs′(t) ≥ p
′. s′ has the next lowest type above the type of the seller, say s′′, who is
the highest type with value less than p′, and ts′′ is at most
λℓSk
(p′)
Λ
by definition of λℓSk(p
′).
Therefore, by event E, there should be at least one seller within each interval of length
1
Λ
, which implies
ts′ ≤
λℓSk(p
′) + 1
Λ
.(B.3)
38 FUHITO KOJIMA AND TAKURO YAMASHITA
Therefore,
Sk(p
′)− Sk(p) > aS
(
λℓSk(p
′)− 1
Λ
−
1
2K
−
λℓSk(p)
Λ
−
1
2K
)
= aS
(
λℓSk(p
′) + 1
Λ
−
1
2K
−
λℓSk(p)− 1
Λ
−
3
Λ
−
1
2K
)
≥ aS
(
ts′ − ts −
3
Λ
−
1
K
)
≥ aS
(
p′ − p
β ′
−
3
Λ
−
1
K
)
,
where the first inequality follows from the definition of λℓSk(p
′) and event E, the equality
follows from calculation, the second inequality follows from inequalities (B.2) and (B.3),
and the last inequality follows because ts′ − ts ≥
vℓ
s′
(t¯)−vℓs(t¯)
β′
≥ p
′−p
β′
by assumption on
p, p′, s, and s′ as well as condition (4.2) in the main text.
Next, suppose that there exists no ℓ ∈ {1, . . . , m} such that vℓs(t) < p ≤ p
′ ≤ vℓs(t). Let
ℓ′ and s′ be defined by:
ℓ′ = min{ℓ˜ ∈ {1, . . . , m}|vℓ˜s¯(t) ≥ p
′},
s′ = argmin
s˜∈Sk
{ts˜|v
ℓ′
s˜ (t) ≥ p
′}.
That is, ℓ′ and s′ satisfy vℓ
′
s′(t) ≥ p
′ and the pair (ℓ′, s′) is the smallest of such pairs with
respect to the lexicographic order that relies first on the index and then on the agent’s
type. Similarly, let ℓ and s be
ℓ = max{ℓ˜ ∈ {1, . . . , m}|vℓ˜s(t) < p},
s = argmax
s˜∈Sk
{ts˜|v
ℓ
s˜(t) < p}.
That is, (ℓ, s) is the largest index-seller pair satisfying vℓs(t) < p with respect to the
lexicographic oder described above. The relation ℓ ≥ ℓ′ contradicts the assumption that
there exists no ℓ ∈ {1, . . . , m} such that vℓs(t) < p ≤ p
′ ≤ vℓs(t), so ℓ
′ > ℓ. Hence,
p′ − p < vℓ
′
s′(t)− v
ℓ
s(t)
≤ [vℓ
′
s′(t)− v
ℓ′
s (0, t−s)] + [v
ℓ′−1
s (1, t−s)− v
ℓ′−1
s (0, t−s)] + ... + [v
ℓ+1
s (1, t−s)− v
ℓ+1
s (0, t−s)]
+[vℓs(1, t−s)− v
ℓ
s(t)] + (ℓ
′ − ℓ)
α
nS
≤ [vℓ
′
s′(t)− v
ℓ′
s (t)] + [v
ℓ
s(t)− v
ℓ
s(t)] +
2β ′
Λ
+
2α
nS
+ (ℓ′ − ℓ− 1)[β ′ + 2(
β ′
Λ
+
α
nS
)] + (ℓ′ − ℓ)
α
nS
≤
λℓ
′
Sk
(p′) + 1
Λ
β ′ + (1−
λℓSk(p)− 1
Λ
)β ′ +
2β ′
Λ
+
2α
nS
+ (ℓ′ − ℓ− 1)[β ′ + 2(
β ′
Λ
+
α
nS
)] + (ℓ′ − ℓ)
α
nS
,
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where the first inequality follows from the definitions of p, p′, s′, ℓ′, s, and ℓ, the second
inequality follows because the “no gap” condition implies
vℓ˜s(1, t−s)− v
ℓ˜+1
s (0, t−s) ≥ v
ℓ˜
s(1, t−s)− v
ℓ˜+1
s (0, t−s)−
α
nS
≥ −
α
nS
,
for each ℓ˜ ∈ {ℓ, ℓ + 1, . . . , ℓ′ − 1}, the third inequality follows because, under event E,
ts ≤
1
Λ
and ts ≥
Λ−1
Λ
, and hence,
vℓ
′
s (t)− v
ℓ′
s (0, t−s) ≤
β ′
Λ
+
α
nS
,
vℓs(1, t−s)− v
ℓ
s(t) ≤
β ′
Λ
+
α
nS
,
by assumption (4.2) in the main text,36 and for each ℓ˜ ∈ {ℓ+ 1, . . . , ℓ′ − 1},
vℓ˜s(1, t−s)− v
ℓ˜
s(0, t−s) ≤ β
′ + 2
[
β ′
Λ
+
α
nS
]
,
and the last inequality follows by definitions of p, p′, ℓ, s, ℓ′, s′, and by assumption (4.2) in
the main text. Rearranging terms, we obtain
λℓ
′
Sk
(p′)+1
Λ
+ 1−
λℓSk
(p)−1
Λ
+ (ℓ′ − ℓ− 1)(B.4)
>
p′−p− 2β
′
Λ
− 2α
nS
−2(ℓ′−ℓ−1)
(
β′
Λ
+ α
nS
)
−(ℓ′−ℓ) α
nS
β′
.
36We obtain those inequalities as follows.
vℓ
′
s (t) = v
ℓ′
s (ts, ts, t−s,s)
≤ vℓ
′
s (ts, 0, t−s,s) +
α
nS
≤ vℓ
′
s (ts, 0, t−s,s) +
α
nS
+
β′
Λ
≤ vℓ
′
s (ts, 0, t−s,s) +
α
nS
+
β′
Λ
= vℓ
′
s (0, ts, t−s,s) +
α
nS
+
β′
Λ
= vℓ
′
s (0, t−s) +
α
nS
+
β′
Λ
,
where, for example, vℓ
′
s (ts, 0, t−s,s) represents the value of s for ℓ
′-th unit when her own type is 0, the
type of s is ts, and the types of the others are t−s,s, and similarly for the other expressions. Similarly,
we obtain
vℓs(1, t−s)− v
ℓ
s(t) ≤
β′
Λ
+
α
nS
.
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Therefore,
Sk(p
′)− Sk(p) > aS
(
λℓ
′
Sk
(p′)− 1
Λ
−
1
2K
− 0
)
+ aS
(
1−
λℓSk(p)
Λ
−
1
2K
)
+ aS(ℓ
′ − ℓ− 1)
≥ aS
(
λℓ
′
Sk
(p′) + 1
Λ
+ 1−
λℓSk(p)− 1
Λ
−
3
Λ
−
1
K
+ (ℓ′ − ℓ− 1)
)
≥ aS

p′ − p− 2β
′
Λ
− 2α
nS
− 2(ℓ′ − ℓ− 1)
(
β′
Λ
+ α
nS
)
− (ℓ′ − ℓ) α
nS
β ′
−
3
Λ
−
1
K


= aS
(
p′ − p
β ′
−
5
Λ
−
1
K
− (ℓ′ − ℓ)
α
β ′nS
− 2(ℓ′ − ℓ)
α
β ′nS
− 2
ℓ′ − ℓ− 1
Λ
)
,
≥ aS
(
p′ − p
β ′
−
3 + 2m
Λ
−
1
K
−
3αm
β ′nS
)
,
where the term aS(ℓ
′−ℓ−1) in the first line corresponds to the supply of the objects from
all agents in submarket K for the (ℓ+1)th, ..., (ℓ′−1)th units, the first inequality follows
from the definition of λℓSk(p
′) and event E, the second inequality follows from calculation,
the third inequality follows from inequality (B.4), the equality follows from calculation,
and the fourth inequality follows from the fact ℓ′ − ℓ ≤ m.
Proof for an upper bound for Sk(·). To obtain an upper bound on the difference in
supplies, let L := {ℓ ∈ {1, . . . , m}|vℓs(t) < p
′ and vℓs¯(t) ≥ p}. We shall first show
λℓSk(p
′)− λℓSk(p)− 2
Λ
β ≤ p′ − p,(B.5)
for each ℓ ∈ L. To show this, let s′ ∈ Sk be the seller in submarket k whose type is the
highest among those with vℓs′(t) ≤ p
′, and s ∈ Sk be the seller in submarket k whose type
is the lowest among those with vℓs(t) > p; Note that such s
′ and s exist since ℓ ∈ L. Then,
ts′ ≥
λℓSk
(p′)−1
Λ
. By event E, ts is either in
[
λℓSk
(p)−1
Λ
,
λℓSk
(p)
Λ
)
or
[
λℓSk
(p)
Λ
,
λℓSk
(p)+1
Λ
)
. Hence,
ts ≤
λℓSk
(p)+1
Λ
. Thus,
p′ − p > vℓs′(t)− v
ℓ
s(t) ≥ β
(
λℓSk(p
′)− λℓSk(p)− 2
Λ
)
,
as desired.
Consider ℓ /∈ L. Suppose first that vℓs(t) ≥ p
′. Then by assumption p′ ≥ p it follows
that vℓs(t) ≥ p, and hence no seller in Sk supplies the ℓ-th unit of the object under either p
or p′. Suppose next that vℓs¯(t) < p. Then by assumption p
′ ≥ p it follows that vℓs¯(t) < p
′,
and hence every seller in Sk supplies the ℓ-th unit of the object under both p and p
′.
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We now show Sk(p
′)−Sk(p) < aSm
(
p′−p
β
+ 3
Λ
+ 1
K
)
. To show this, applying inequality
(B.5) and the above argument we obtain
Sk(p
′)− Sk(p) < aS
∑
ℓ∈L
(
λℓSk(p
′)
Λ
+
1
2K
−
(
λℓSk(p)− 1
Λ
−
1
2K
))
= aS
∑
ℓ∈L
(
λℓSk(p
′)− λℓSk(p)− 2
Λ
+
3
Λ
+
1
K
)
≤ aSm
(
p′ − p
β
+
3
Λ
+
1
K
)
.
Proof for a lower bound for Dk(·). Let b ∈ Bk be the seller who has the lowest type
in Bk, and b ∈ Bk be the seller who has the highest type in Bk. We consider the following
two cases.
First, suppose that there exists ℓ ∈ {1, . . . , m} such that vℓb(t) < p ≤ p
′ ≤ vℓ
b
(t). Let
b′ ∈ Bk be the seller in submarket k whose type is the lowest among those with v
ℓ
b′(t) ≥ p
′.
Then we obtain the following inequality:37
tb′ <
λℓBk(p
′) + 1
Λ
.(B.6)
Similarly, let b ∈ Bk be the seller in submarket k whose type is the highest among those
with vℓb(t) < p. Then, the following inequality follows:
38
tb ≥
λℓBk(p)− 1
Λ
.(B.7)
37This inequality follows because
[
λℓBk
(p′)
Λ ,
λℓB(p
′)+1
Λ
)
is defined as the interval that contains the lowest
type of the buyers in Bk whose ℓ-th unit value given t is higher than or equal to p
′.
38To obtain this inequality, recall that tb is the type just below the lowest type of the buyers in
Bk whose ℓ-th unit value given t is higher than or equal to p, and the latter type is in the interval[
λℓBk
(p)
Λ ,
λℓB(p)+1
Λ
)
by definition. By event E, tb can be smaller than
λℓBk
(p)
Λ at most by
1
Λ , so we obtain
inequality (B.7).
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Therefore,
Dk(p)−Dk(p
′) > aB
[(
1−
λℓBk(p) + 1
Λ
−
1
2K
)
−
(
1−
λℓBk(p
′)
Λ
+
1
2K
)]
= aB
(
λℓBk(p
′) + 1
Λ
−
1
2K
−
λℓBk(p)− 1
Λ
−
1
2K
−
3
Λ
)
≥ aB
(
tb′ − tb −
3
Λ
−
1
K
)
≥ aB
(
p′ − p
β ′
−
3
Λ
−
1
K
)
,
where the first inequality follows from the definition of λℓBk(p
′), the equality follows from
calculation, the second inequality follows from inequalities (B.6) and (B.7), and the last
inequality follows because tb′ − tb ≥
vℓ
b′
(t¯)−vℓ
b
(t¯)
β′
> p
′−p
β′
by assumption on p, p′, b, and b′ as
well as condition (4.2) in the main text.
Next, suppose that there exists no ℓ ∈ {1, . . . , m} such that vℓb(t) < p ≤ p
′ ≤ vℓ
b
(t). Let
ℓ′ and b′ be defined by:
ℓ′ = min{ℓ˜ ∈ {1, . . . , m}|vℓ˜b¯(t) ≥ p
′},
b′ = arg min
b˜∈Bk
{tb˜|v
ℓ′
b˜
(t) ≥ p′}.
That is, ℓ′ and b′ satisfy vℓ
′
b′(t) ≥ p
′ and the pair (ℓ′, b′) is the smallest of such pairs with
respect to the lexicographic order that relies first on the index and then on the agent’s
type. Similarly, let ℓ and b be
ℓ = max{ℓ˜ ∈ {1, . . . , m}|vℓ˜b(t) < p},
b = argmax
b˜∈Bk
{ts˜|v
ℓ
b˜
(t) < p}.
That is, (ℓ, b) is the largest index-seller pair satisfying vℓb(t) < p with respect to the
lexicographic oder described above. The relation ℓ ≥ ℓ′ contradicts the assumption that
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there exists no ℓ ∈ {1, . . . , m} such that vℓb(t) < p ≤ p
′ ≤ vℓ
b
(t), so ℓ′ > ℓ. Hence,
p′ − p < vℓ
′
b′(t)− v
ℓ
b(t)
≤ [vℓ
′
b′(t)− v
ℓ′
b (0, t−b)] + [v
ℓ′−1
b
(1, t−b)− v
ℓ′−1
b (0, t−b)] + ...+ [v
ℓ+1
b
(1, t−b)− v
ℓ+1
b (0, t−b)]
+[vℓ
b
(1, t−b)− v
ℓ
b(t)] + (ℓ
′ − ℓ)
α
nB
≤ [vℓ
′
b′(t)− v
ℓ′
b (t)] + [v
ℓ
b
(t)− vℓb(t)] +
2β ′
Λ
+
2α
nB
+ (ℓ′ − ℓ− 1)[β ′ + 2(
β ′
Λ
+
α
nB
)] + (ℓ′ − ℓ)
α
nB
≤
λℓ
′
Bk
(p′) + 1
Λ
β ′ + (1−
λℓBk(p)− 1
Λ
)β ′ +
2β ′
Λ
+
2α
nB
+ (ℓ′ − ℓ− 1)[β ′ + 2(
β ′
Λ
+
α
nB
)] + (ℓ′ − ℓ)
α
nB
,
where the first inequality follows from the definitions of p, p′, b′, ℓ′, b, and ℓ, the second
inequality follows because the “no gap” assumption implies
vℓ˜
b
(1, t−b)− v
ℓ˜+1
b (0, t−b) ≥ v
ℓ˜
b
(1, t−b)− v
ℓ˜+1
b (0, t−b)−
α
nB
≥ −
α
nB
,
for each ℓ˜ ∈ {ℓ, ℓ + 1, . . . , ℓ′ − 1}, the third inequality follows because, under event E,
tb ≤
1
Λ
and tb ≥
Λ−1
Λ
, and hence,
vℓ
′
b (t)− v
ℓ′
b (0, t−b) ≤
β ′
Λ
+
α
nB
,
vℓ
b
(1, t−b)− v
ℓ
b
(t) ≤
β ′
Λ
+
α
nB
,
by assumption (4.2) in the main text, for each ℓ˜ ∈ {ℓ+ 1, . . . , ℓ′ − 1},
vℓ˜
b
(1, t−b)− v
ℓ˜
b(0, t−b) ≤ β
′ + 2
[
β ′
Λ
+
α
nB
r
]
,
and the last inequality follows by definitions of p, p′, ℓ, b, ℓ′, b′, and by assumption (4.2) in
the main text. Rearranging terms, we obtain
λℓ
′
Bk
(p′)+1
Λ
+ 1−
λℓ
Bk
(p)−1
Λ
+ (ℓ′ − ℓ− 1)(B.8)
>
p′−p− 2β
′
Λ
− 2α
nB
−2(ℓ′−ℓ−1)(β
′
Λ
+ α
nB
)−(ℓ′−ℓ) α
nB
β′
.
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Therefore,
Dk(p)−Dk(p
′) > aB
(
1−
λℓBk(p) + 1
Λ
−
1
2K
)
+ aB
(
λℓ
′
Bk
(p′)
Λ
−
1
2K
)
+ aB(ℓ
′ − ℓ− 1)
≥ aB
(
λℓ
′
Bk
(p′) + 1
Λ
+ 1−
λℓBk(p)− 1
Λ
−
3
Λ
−
1
K
+ (ℓ′ − ℓ− 1)
)
≥ aB
(
p′ − p− 2β
′
Λ
− 2α
nB
− 2(ℓ′ − ℓ− 1)(β
′
Λ
+ α
nB
)− (ℓ′ − ℓ) α
nB
β ′
−
3
Λ
−
1
K
)
= aB
(
p′ − p
β ′
−
5
Λ
−
1
K
− (ℓ′ − ℓ)
α
β ′nB
− 2(ℓ′ − ℓ)
α
β ′nB
− 2
ℓ′ − ℓ− 1
Λ
)
,
≥ aB
(
p′ − p
β ′
−
3 + 2m
Λ
−
1
K
−
3αm
β ′nB
)
,
where the term aB(ℓ
′ − ℓ − 1) in the first line corresponds to the supply of the objects
from all agents in submarket K for the (ℓ + 1)th, ..., (ℓ′ − 1)th units, the first inequality
follows from the definition of λℓBk(p
′), the second inequality follows from calculation, the
third inequality follows from inequality (B.8), the equality follows from calculation, and
the fourth inequality follows from the fact ℓ′ − ℓ ≤ m.
Proof for an upper bound for Dk(·). To obtain an upper bound on the difference in
demands, let L := {ℓ ∈ {1, . . . , m}|vℓb(t) < p
′ and vℓ
b¯
(t) ≥ p}. We shall first show
λℓBk(p
′)− λℓBk(p)− 2
Λ
β ≤ p′ − p,(B.9)
for each ℓ ∈ L. To show this, let b′ ∈ Bk be the seller in submarket k whose type is the
highest among those with vℓb′(t) < p
′, and b ∈ Bk be the seller in submarket k whose type
is the lowest among those with vℓb(t) ≥ p; Note that such b
′ and b exist since ℓ ∈ L. Then,
tb′ ≥
λℓ
Bk
(p′)−1
Λ
and tb ≤
λℓ
Bk
(p)+1
Λ
. Thus,
p′ − p > vℓb′(t)− v
ℓ
b(t) ≥ β
(
λℓBk(p
′)− λℓBk(p)− 2
Λ
)
,
as desired.
Consider ℓ /∈ L. Suppose first that vℓb(t) ≥ p
′. Then by assumption p′ ≥ p it follows
that vℓb(t) ≥ p, and hence every buyer in Bk demands the ℓ-th unit of the object under
both p and p′. Suppose next that vℓ
b¯
(t) < p. Then by assumption p′ ≥ p it follows that
vℓ
b¯
(t) < p′, and hence no buyer in Bk demands the ℓ-th unit of the object under either p
or p′.
We now show Dk(p)−Dk(p
′) < aBm
(
p′−p
β
+ 3
Λ
+ 1
K
)
. To show this, applying inequality
(B.9) and the above argument we obtain
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Dk(p)−Dk(p
′) < aB
∑
ℓ∈L
((
1−
λℓBk(p)
Λ
+
1
2K
)
−
(
1−
λℓBk(p
′)− 1
Λ
−
1
2K
))
= aB
∑
ℓ∈L
(
λℓBk(p
′)− λℓBk(p)− 2
Λ
+
3
Λ
+
1
K
)
≤ aBm
(
p′ − p
β
+
3
Λ
+
1
K
)
.

Lemma 7 has an implication for the shape of the inverse demand and supply functions.
Lemma 8. Let x′ > x. Let D−1k (x
′) denote an arbitrary price p′ such that Dk(p
′) = x′.
Similarly, define D−1k (x), S
−1
k (x
′), S−1k (x). Then,
S−1k (x
′)− S−1k (x) ∈
((
x′ − x
aSm
−
3
Λ
−
1
K
)
β,
(
x′ − x
aS
+
3 + 2m
Λ
+
1
K
+
3αm
β ′nS
)
β ′
)
,
D−1k (x)−D
−1
k (x
′) ∈
((
x′ − x
aBm
−
3
Λ
−
1
K
)
β,
(
x′ − x
aB
+
3 + 2m
Λ
+
1
K
+
3αm
β ′nB
)
β ′
)
.
Proof. We first show the bounds for the supply. Let p′ = S−1k (x
′) and p = S−1k (x). Observe
that p′ ≥ p, x′ = Sk(p
′) and x = Sk(p). By Lemma 7,
x′ − x ∈
(
aS
(
p′ − p
β ′
−
3 + 2m
Λ
−
1
K
−
3αm
β ′nS
)
, aSm
(
p′ − p
β
+
3
Λ
+
1
K
))
,
or equivalently,
p′ − p ∈
((
x′ − x
aSm
−
3
Λ
−
1
K
)
β,
(
x′ − x
aS
+
3 + 2m
Λ
+
1
K
+
3αm
β ′nS
)
β ′
)
.
The proof for D−1(·) is symmetric and hence omitted. 
Now we shall prove the theorem. Recall that Sk(qk) > Dk(qk) and Dk(qk) > Sk(qk).
These imply D−1k (Sk(qk)), S
−1
k (Dk(qk)) ≥ qk, and D
−1
k (Sk(qk)), S
−1
k (Dk(qk)) ≤ qk. The
per-capita budget surplus in the submarket k is at most max{D−1k (Sk(qk)) − qk, qk −
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S−1k (Dk(qk))}. We observe that this converges to zero as the market size grows. First,
D−1k (Sk(qk))− qk ≤ D
−1
k (Sk(qk))− qk +
[
Sk(qk)− Sk(qk)
aB
+
3 + 2m
Λ
+
1
K
+
3αm
β ′nB
]
β ′
≤ qk − qk +
[
aSm
aB
(
qk − qk
β
+
3
Λ
+
1
K
)
+
3 + 2m
Λ
+
1
K
+
3αm
β ′nB
]
β ′
≤ (qk − qk)
(
1 +
β ′aSm
βaB
)
+
[
3 + 2m+ 3aSm
aB
Λ
+
aSm
aB
+ 1
K
+
3αm
β ′nB
]
β ′
≤
(
β ′
(
2
K
+
6
Λ
)
+
2α
K
)(
1 +
β ′aSm
βaB
)
+
[
3 + 2m+ 3aSm
aB
Λ
+
aSm
aB
+ 1
K
+
3αm
β ′nB
]
β ′,
where the first inequality follows from Lemma 8, the second inequality follows from Lemma
7, and the last inequality follows from the definitions of q¯k and qk. Therefore, it converges
to zero as the market size grows.
Similarly,
qk − S
−1
k (Dk(qk)) ≤ qk − S
−1
k (Dk(qk)) +
[
Dk(qk)−Dk(qk)
aS
+
3 + 2m
Λ
+
1
K
+
3αm
β ′nS
]
β ′
≤ qk − qk +
[
aBm
aS
(
qk − qk
β
+
3
Λ
+
1
K
)
+
3 + 2m
Λ
+
1
K
+
3αm
β ′nS
]
β ′
≤ (qk − qk)
(
1 +
β ′aBm
βaS
)
+
[
3 + 2m+ 3aBm
aS
Λ
+
aBm
aS
+ 1
K
+
3αm
β ′nS
]
β ′
≤
(
β ′
(
2
K
+
6
Λ
)
+
2α
K
)(
1 +
β ′aBm
βaS
)
+
[
3 + 2m+ 3aBm
aS
Λ
+
aBm
aS
+ 1
K
+
3αm
β ′nS
]
β ′,
where the first inequality follows from Lemma 8, the second inequality follows from Lemma
7, and the last inequality follows from the definitions of q¯k and qk. Therefore, it converges
to zero as the market size grows. These show the desired conclusion.
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